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 UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OR PERSONALIZED 
LAW? A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF PARKING 
TICKET APPEALS IN CHICAGO 
 
RANDALL K. JOHNSON* 
 
This Article is one in a series of papers that sets the record straight about the type, 
quality, and quantity of information that U.S. cities may employ, so as to make more 
informed policy decisions. It does so, specifically, by examining information that is 
collected by the City of Chicago: in order to gauge the uniformity, as well as the 
relative cost effectiveness, of the parking ticket appeals process. The Article has six 
(VI) parts. Part I is the introduction, which sets the stage for a preliminary 
examination of the parking ticket appeals process in Chicago. Part II describes the 
applicable law. Part III explains this Article’s methodological approach, which 
employs percentage analysis to explain how parking tickets are distributed, how 
parking ticket appeals are distributed, and how frequently ticket recipients obtain 
relief in Chicago. Part IV outlines the Article's findings and positive analysis, which 
includes the fact that more advantaged zip codes have higher administrative costs 
and lower error rates than disadvantaged zip codes. Part V contains its key 
normative recommendations. Part VI is the conclusion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Parking attendants,1 often, prefer selective enforcement2 to the hard work of 
uniformly applying the law.3 This preference for selective enforcement4 continues, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Public Service Law Center, 
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Jeremy Kidd, Professor Ben Edwards, Professor Evan Seamone, Dean Patricia Bennett, 
Professor Christophe Henkel, Professor Mark Modak-Truran, and the 2017–2018 MC Law 
Publications Grant Program. Thanks also are due to the participants in the 2017–18 Legal 
Scholarship Workshop at the University of Chicago Law School and the participants in the 
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 1. By use of the term “parking attendant,” this article makes reference to any individual 
that is given the authority to write a parking ticket. See Parking Enforcement Officer: Job 
Duties, Requirements and Outlook, STUDY.COM (2018), 
http://study.com/articles/Parking_Enforcement_Officer_Job_Duties_Requirements_and_Out
look.html [https://perma.cc/4U3C-7ZGH] (“A parking enforcement officer monitors roads 
and lots, ensuring drivers abide by local and state parking laws. They typically hand out 
citations and communicate with drivers.”). Examples, at least in the case of Chicago, are police 
officers, parking enforcement aides, Chicago Transit Authority managers, and private 
contractors. For more on traffic-related sanctions, as opposed to only parking related ones, a 
good starting point may be James P. Economos’ seminal “Traffic Court Procedure and 
Administration (Published by the American Bar Association, Standing Committee On the 
Traffic Court Program, American Bar Center 1961). 
 2. See, e.g., Hadar Aviram & Daniel L. Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing 
the Concept of Equity into Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 
415 (2009) (implying that selective enforcement falls under their “working definition of 
‘inequitable enforcement’” which is any “law enforcement activity which, despite satisfying 
constitutional review, violates notions of fairness, proportionality, and proper resource 
allocation.”). 
 3. This preference, at least on the part of parking attendants that also serve in other public 
capacities, may arise from a series of federal decisions that discourage victims of public sector 
misconduct from bringing suit against negligent public employees. See, e.g., George M. Dery 
III & Jacklyn R. Vasquez, Why Should an “Innocent Citizen” Shoulder the Burden of an 
Officer’s Mistake of Law? Heien v. North Carolina Tells Police to Detain First and Learn the 
Law Later, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 301, 302–03 (2015) (“Ignorance of the law is no excuse, 
unless you are a police officer. While motorists are expected to understand and comply with a 
‘multitude’ of ‘traffic and equipment regulations,’ the Supreme Court in Heien v. North 
Carolina, ruled that an officer may properly seize a driver based on a ‘mistaken understanding’ 
of the law.”). 
 4. E.g., Mara Shulman Ryan, Criminal Law -- Invisible in the Courtroom Too: 
Modifying the Law of Selective Enforcement to Account for White Privilege, 34 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 301, 305 (2012) (“It is not unusual for police officers to perform their official duties 
in a discriminatory manner.”). 
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even if, uniform treatment is actually required.5 Illustrative examples of this 
preference are found in recent Illinois cases.6 
After being issued twenty-four parking tickets by the Chicago Police Department 
(“CPD”), beginning in October 2007, Mark Geinosky filed suit in the Northern 
District of Illinois.7 In this case, Geinosky v. City of Chicago, the plaintiff asserted 
that his rights were violated by the defendant’s issuance of clearly invalid parking 
tickets.8 The theory of this case was that the CPD ran afoul of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,9 in 
a variety of ways, by refusing to throw out these unlawfully issued tickets.10  
The district court did not find that theory to be compelling, mostly because it did 
not accept that Geinosky had been singled out by parking attendants.11 The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, proved to be a more sympathetic audience.12 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. Compare CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 9-64-220(b) (2017) (“Whenever any vehicle is 
parked in violation of any provision of the traffic code . . . any police officer, traffic control 
aide, other designated member of the police department, parking enforcement aide or other 
person designated by the Traffic Compliance Administrator observing such violation may 
issue a parking violation notice.”), with Mark Konkol, Are Rogue Meter Maids Sticking It to 
Parkers One Bogus Ticket at a Time?, DNA INFO (July 21, 2015), 
https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20150721/south-loop/are-rogue-meter-maids-sticking-it-
parkers-one-bogus-ticket-at-time [https://perma.cc/H4U3-2PX6] (“According to city [of 
Chicago] regulations, meter maids are trained to follow a very specific protocol before writing 
a ticket: Check the windshield for a valid parking receipt. Look for a motorist near the vehicle 
or parking payment station. Search the mobile meter system for the vehicle’s license plate 
number to confirm payment. Double-check the license plate number. And before ticket-writers 
are allowed out [on] the street, they sign a document saying they’ll abide by [all applicable 
laws and municipal] rules.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012) (upholding in 
part, and reversing in part, the earlier decision). 
 7. Id. at 745; see also, Jon Yates, Problem Solver: Ticketgate Ends in Settlement, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 20, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-20/business/ct-
biz-1220-problem-geinosky-20121220_1_mark-geinosky-class-of-one-discrimination-
unlawful-civil-conspiracy [https://perma.cc/8L82-SJXX] (“[Beginning in October 2007, 
Geinosky] received two dozen tickets . . . . For each ticket, he proved his car was not parked 
in the designated location at the time.”). 
 8. See Yates, supra note 7 (“Geinosky claimed ‘class-of-one’ discrimination[,] . . . denial 
of substantive due process rights[,] and unlawful civil conspiracy.”). 
 9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil action for deprivation of rights (2012) (“Every person 
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that 
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated 
or declaratory relief was unavailable.”). 
 10. Yates, supra note 7 (“[Chicago’s]Police Board . . . failed to explain why Geinosky 
had received the tickets.”). 
 11. Id. (“In 2011, a district court judge dismissed the suit, saying Geinosky had failed to 
prove his claims.”). 
 12. Id. (“[Through the issuance of] a sharply worded opinion . . . the 7th U.S. Circuit 
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Judge David F. Hamilton, who wrote on behalf of a three-judge panel, found that “a 
closer look at the . . . facts . . . reveals a disturbing pattern. Absent a reasonable 
explanation [by the CPD] . . . the pattern adds up to deliberate and unjustified official 
harassment [of Geinosky] that is actionable under the Equal Protection [clause].”13  
About the same time that Geinosky was working its way through the federal 
courts, but prior to its settlement in December 2012,14 another excessive ticketing 
case was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County.15 This Illinois state court case, 
Fitzgerald v. City of Chicago, elicited a similarly sympathetic response from the 
judiciary.16 After reading the pleadings, which stated that Jennifer M. Fitzgerald 
improperly “racked up . . . 678 parking tickets totaling more than $106,000 while 
[her car remained] parked in the same spot [at O’Hare International Airport] for 2 ½ 
years,” Judge Thomas Allen denied the City of Chicago’s motion to dismiss with 
prejudice.17  
One of the key reasons that Judge Allen would not grant the motion was that 
parking attendants had selectively enforced the law.18 For example, as the plaintiff 
correctly pointed out, the “municipal code states that cars parked at O’Hare for more 
than 30 days will be ticketed and towed immediately, meaning most of the tickets 
should never have been written.”19 As a result, Judge Allen gave Fitzgerald a chance 
to refile instead of dismissing the case with prejudice.20 An out-of-court settlement 
was reached by Chicago, Fitzgerald, and an unrelated third party so as to avoid trial.21 
                                                                                                                 
 
Court of Appeals reinstated the lawsuit, calling Geinosky’s claims of harassment 
‘troubling.’”). 
 13. Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 745.  
 14. Yates, supra note 7 (“Geinosky said . . . that he has reached a settlement to end his 
federal lawsuit.”) 
 15. Complaint, Fitzgerald v. City of Chicago, No. 2012-CH-40263 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2012), 
http://theexpiredmeter.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/fitzgerald.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7KSG-K9TP] (dismissing, at least in part, plaintiff’s claim). 
 16. Mike Brockway, City Offers to Drop Record $105,000 Parking Fine to Just $2,500, 
DNA INFO (Apr. 10, 2013), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20130410/ohare/city-offers-
drop-record-100000-parking-fine-just-2500 (“[Jennifer M.] Fitzgerald, through pro bono 
attorney Robin Omahana, filed a lawsuit against the city [of Chicago] and [an unrelated third-
party, Brandon] Preveau in November [2012].”).  
 17. Mike Brockway, City Settles $100,000 Parking Ticket Case: ‘It was a Nightmare,’ 
DNA INFO (Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20130822/ohare/city-settles-
100000-parking-ticket-case [https://perma.cc/R7QJ-Y22D] (“When Fitzgerald’s lawsuit came 
before Cook County Circuit Judge Thomas Allen in April, he dismissed the case but allowed 
Omahana to file an amended complaint.”).  
 18. Id. (“Omahana . . . argued, based on [the express language found in the] municipal 
code, that the city should have towed the car years earlier and that only a fraction of the tickets 
issued were written legitimately.”).  
 19. Brockway, supra note 16. 
 20. Id. (“Allen ultimately dismissed the case, but gave Fitzgerald 28 days to amend her 
complaint and address the objections raised by the city and Preveau. He also encouraged all 
parties to try to work out a settlement.”). 
 21. Brockway, supra note 17 (“The City of Chicago recently agreed to drop more than 
$100,000 in parking ticket fines on a car registered in Fitzgerald’s name that racked up a record 
678 tickets.”). 
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Geinosky and Fitzgerald, among other recent controversies,22 imply that parking 
attendants may not be uniformly enforcing the parking laws.23 The city, however, 
rejects any such implication.24 As a result, additional research is needed so as to 
determine how the law is applied in Chicago. 
This research may have profound implications, especially if it asks and answers 
several open questions. For example, is irrelevant information being used to inform 
ticketing decisions in Chicago, such as the race, income, or home zip code of a 
driver? If erroneous decisions result from using irrelevant information, then how are 
these outcomes distributed by zip code? In the event that such outcomes are 
disproportionately imposed, then how to limit selective enforcement in Chicago? 
My Article asks and answers all three questions specifically by focusing on an 
issue that was raised in Geinosky and Fitzgerald: what are the costs of permitting 
selective enforcement, which is an impermissibly “personalized” way of applying 
the law?25 It does so, initially, by using percentage analysis to determine how parking 
tickets, parking ticket appeals, and successful parking ticket appeals are distributed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. See, e.g., Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, Data Analysis: Bankruptcy and Race in 
America, PROPUBLICA (Sep. 27, 2017), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/bankruptcy-
data-analysis#Illinois [https://perma.cc/2VKH-HAXN] (“In a recent examination of 
bankruptcy filings in Cook County, Illinois . . . Edward Morrison and Antoine Uettwiller of 
Columbia Law School came to the conclusion that fines from state and local governments . . . 
were a primary driver of the racial disparities in the district. Black debtors often chose to file 
under Chapter 13 in order to prevent the seizure of a car or suspension of a driver’s licenses . 
. . And since these debtors tended to have lower incomes, they failed to complete their Chapter 
13 plans at higher rates.”); Fran Spielman, City Worker Yanked Out of NW Side After Writing 
Thousands of Tickets, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 22, 2017, 
http://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-politics/city-employee-yanked-out-of-nw-side-for-
writing-too-many-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/P6PJ-GQX8] (“[Chicago Parking Enforcement 
Aide] Andrew J. Petersen infuriated local residents by bragging about his ticket totals in an 
almost taunting string of Facebook posts.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Kate L. Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: 
Evidence from the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163 (2009) (describing 
the fact that some police officers engage in racially-discriminatory enforcement whenever the 
race of the driver and race of the officer are not the same). 
 24. While parking ticket attendants do not use the same standard in issuing tickets, the 
City of Chicago confirms that these agents actually receive relatively-standard training. 
Compare Mike Brockway, Private Meter Readers Wrote Hundreds of Thousands of Tickets, 
Data Shows, DNA INFO (Mar. 31, 2015), 
https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20131231/downtown/private-meter-readers-wrote-
hundreds-of-thousands-of-tickets-data-shows [https://perma.cc/97DT-P2W9] (“[P]arking 
enforcement personnel . . . have to go through a mandatory training process to ensure they are 
writing tickets properly.”) with Konkol, supra note 5 (“City parking enforcement supervisors 
check for patterns of ‘errors’ made by tracking voided tickets or fines caused by individual 
ticket-writers.”). 
 25. The fact that agents are given broad discretion does not mean that they may 
“personalize” the law by applying it in expressly unauthorized ways. See Call for Papers: 
Symposium on Personalized Law, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW (2018), 
http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/call-papers-symposium-personalized-law 
[https://perma.cc/D55Z-WKLW] (defining personalized law as “legal rules tailored to specific 
individuals or circumstances.”).  
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by zip code in Chicago.26 The Article later tests a simple hypothesis: that 
disadvantaged zip codes may not be treated the same, in terms of how parking tickets 
are distributed, parking tickets are appealed and parking ticket appeals are granted, 
as the average Chicago zip code. It concludes with a finding about whether there is 
uniform treatment, at least in terms of how parking tickets are distributed and handled 
over time (i.e. 2012 to 2016), as determined by the use of a simplified measure of 
distributional fairness. 27  
In carrying out this work, the Article draws on recent scholarship in local 
government law. It is informed, for example, by cutting-edge behavioral law and 
economics research,28 which focuses on the distributive effects of specific public 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Cf. Randall K. Johnson, Where Schools Close in Chicago, 7 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 508, 
510–11 n.20 (2014) (“This article . . . directly answers the question by using a composition-
based approach to establishing disproportionality [i.e. percentage analysis]. In doing so, it 
serves as a starting point for more rigorous empirical work . . . in keeping with the analysis 
from a popular statistics textbook, ‘the null hypothesis [of future research will be] that the 
populations from which the samples are drawn are equal on the characteristics of interest . . .  
[if] the null hypothesis of “no difference” in the populations is true, then any means calculated 
from randomly selected samples should be roughly equal in value.’ As a result, future research 
may go beyond the basic question to be answered in this article: ‘are there [any significant] 
differences between the samples or categories of the independent variable?’ Instead, it [will 
ask]: ‘are the [observed] differences between the samples large enough to reject the null 
hypothesis and [to] justify the conclusion that the populations represented by the samples are 
different?’” (citing JOSEPH F. HEALY, STATISTICS: A TOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 239 (Lin 
Marshall et al. eds., 6th ed. 2002))). 
 27. Distributional fairness, which assumes that justice depends upon the amount of in-
kind goods that a government provides to its citizens, is a valid way to determine whether 
similarly-situated people are treated in a uniform way. Another valid option, allocational 
fairness, assumes that justice depends upon the amount of money that a government spends in 
providing in-kind goods to its citizens. The key difference between these two approaches is 
their unit of analysis, as distributional fairness directly measures state action (i.e. state action 
is measured by what a specific government produces and turns over to citizens in terms of 
public goods and services) whereas allocational fairness indirectly measures state action (i.e. 
state action is measured by what a specific government spends to produce and turn over to 
citizens in terms of public goods and services). Cf. Herman E. Daly, Allocation, distribution, 
and scale: towards an economics that is efficient, just and sustainable, 6 ECOL. ECON. 185, 
186 (1992): 
Allocation refers to the relative division of the resource flow among alternative 
product uses – how much goes to the production of cars, to shoes, to plows, to 
teapots, etc. A good allocation is one that is efficient, i.e. that allocates resources 
among product end-uses in conformity with individual preferences as weighted 
by the ability of the individual to pay...  
Distribution refers to the relative division of the resource flow, as embodied in 
final goods and services, among alternative people. A good distribution is one 
that is just and fair, or at least one in which the degree of inequality is limited 
within some acceptable range... 
 28. See, e.g., Zachary D. Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased? (Yale Law & Economics Research 
Paper, Paper No. 581, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3018796 
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policies such as municipal appeals processes. The Article also builds on 
interdisciplinary scholarship that investigates the relationship between permissive 
appeals processes and local budgetary issues.29 A third influence is an emerging body 
of work, which examines the nature of the relationship between seemingly-neutral 
legal rules, which often govern local decision-making, and distributional fairness.30 
Within this context, the Article makes key contributions to all three lines of 
research. It does so, initially, by identifying how parking tickets are distributed across 
the 59 zip codes in Chicago. This Article, then, identifies the zip code location of 
every parking ticket recipient that filed an appeal over the last five years (2012 to 
2016). Third, it identifies the zip code location of every parking ticket recipient that 
successfully appealed during the study period. The Article concludes by analyzing 
these data, including the computation of statistics such as win rate on appeal, so as 
to determine whether certain disadvantaged zip codes are treated any differently than 
the average Chicago zip code in terms of distributional fairness.31 The key question 
is whether parking ticket error rates, as measured by the use of win rates on appeal 
so as to gauge distributional fairness, are distributed uniformly during the study 
period.    
This Article, in other words, assumes that disproportionate treatment may arise 
from the characteristics of people that live within specific zip codes. It also assumes 
that the most salient of these characteristics could be race, income, and location, as 
indicated by recent studies of how public goods and services are distributed across 
municipal space in Chicago.32 These assumptions lead to the testing of a simple 
                                                                                                                 
 
[https://perma.cc/3TXS-WZBP] (explaining whether, or not, economically-efficient policies 
lead to discrimination). 
 29. See Randall K. Johnson, Who Wins Residential Property Tax Appeals?, 6 COLUM. J. 
OF TAX L. 209 (2015) (applying percentage analysis to determine if more property tax appeals 
are filed, and won, by certain Cook County townships.). 
 30. See, e.g., Zachary D. Liscow, Are Court Orders Sticky? Evidence on Distributional 
Impacts from School Finance Litigation 15 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 4 (2018), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jels.12172 (explaining whether, or not, 
economically-efficient legal rules lead to distributional fairness).  
 31. Cf. Randall K. Johnson, How Tax Increment Financing (TIF) Districts Correlate with 
Taxable Properties, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 39, 41 n.19 (2013) (“This Article [makes its findings 
and reaches its conclusions] by using Microsoft Excel . . . . See, e.g., OFFICE, 
http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/excel-help/correl-HP005209023.aspx.”). 
 32. See, e.g., MARY PATTILLO, BLACK ON THE BLOCK: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CLASS 
IN THE CITY 2 (2008) (“The story of the gentrification of North Kenwood–Oakland by middle- 
and upper-income African Americans—assisted by municipal, institutional, philanthropic, and 
corporate actors—makes clear the existence of divergent class interests within the black 
community.”); ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING 
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 6 (2012) (“Spatially inscribed social differences, I argue, constitute a 
family of ‘neighborhood effects’ that are pervasive, strong, cross-cutting, and paradoxically 
stable even as they are changing in manifest form."); Stephanie Schmitz Bechteler, 100 Years 
and Counting: The Enduring Legacy of Racial Residential Segregation in Chicago in the Post-
Civil Rights Era, THE CHICAGO URBAN LEAGUE 1, 3 (2016), 
https://www.thechicagourbanleague.org/cms/lib07/IL07000264/Centricity/Domain/1/CULtiv
ate%20Part%201_Residential%20Segregation%20and%20Housing-
Transportation_Final%20Draft_3-1-16_10P.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS5U-4JPB]  (“In this 
2018] UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OR PERSONALIZED LAW?  41 
 
hypothesis that has to do with whether disadvantaged zip codes may be treated 
differently from more advantaged zip codes, at least with respect to the parking ticket 
appeals process.33 This hypothesis aligns with recently-substantiated claims that 
Chicago often distributes some public goods/services in a discriminatory manner.34  
I have tested similar hypotheses in several recent articles;35 since my past work 
also focused on if there were any differences in treatment rather than whether 
observed differences actually matter.36 The basic idea, as applied in this study of 
                                                                                                                 
 
inaugural series, we will examine some of the current impacts of enduring racial residential 
segregation on the lives of African-Americans in Chicago.”).  
 33. See, e.g., Mary Wisniewski, ‘Biking while black’: Chicago Minority Areas See the 
Most Bike Tickets, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 17, 2017, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-bike-tickets-minorities-
0319-20170317-story.html [https://perma.cc/3BQ6-78LN] (“As Chicago police ramp up their 
ticketing of bicyclists, more than twice as many citations are being written in African-
American communities than in white or Latino areas, as Tribune review of police statistics has 
found.”). 
 34. See supra note 25. Discrimination may be used offensively and defensively, so as to 
undercut the rights of socially-unpopular groups and to expand the rights of popular ones. See, 
e.g., John Byrne, City Workers Gave Out Free Street Parking to Friends During Blackhawks, 
Bulls Games, CBS CHICAGO (Jul. 17, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-chicago-workers-street-parking-scam-
met-20170717-story.html  [https://perma.cc/3LQD-8VHP] (“While many regular fans were 
shelling out big bucks to park near United Center, Chicago city workers . . .  set aside free 
street parking for friends and family.”).  
 35. My past work with simplified models has inspired follow-up research, which uses 
regression analysis to look at the residential property tax appeals process in the City of Chicago 
and Cook County as a whole. Compare Johnson, supra note 29 (applying percentage analysis 
to determine who wins residential property tax appeals in Cook County) with ROBERT ROSS, 
U. CHI. HARRIS PUB. POL’Y, THE IMPACT OF PROPERTY TAX APPEALS ON VERTICAL EQUITY IN 
COOK COUNTY, IL (2017), http://apps.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/cook-county-
property-tax-divide/data/harris-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8W6-RH7Y] (applying 
regression analysis to determine who wins residential property tax appeals in Cook County). 
This follow-up work has garnered attention from local, state, national, and international 
publications and substantiated my preliminary research findings about residential property tax 
appeals in Cook County. See, e.g., Jason Grotto & Sandhya Kambhampati, The Tax Divide: 
Commercial Breakdown, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 7, 2017, 
http://apps.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/cook-county-property-tax-divide/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/UL8M-FW2W] (“Owners of residential properties, as a group, also ended 
up paying more in property taxes than they would have if the assessor’s office had done its 
work properly. The total amount of property taxes levied in a given year is fixed, so if one 
group of property owners doesn’t pay its fair share, others have to make up the difference.”). 
 36. See Randall K. Johnson, Do Police Learn From Lawsuit Data, 40 RUTGERS L. REC. 
30 (2012–2013), http://lawrecord.com/files/40_Rutgers_L_Rec_30.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2M6T-K85D] (applying a ratio-based approach to determine the nature of 
the relationship between lawsuit data collection and published §1983 cases); Randall K. 
Johnson, How the United States Postal Service (USPS) Could Encourage More Local 
Economic Development, 92 CHI. KENT L. REV. 593 (2017) (applying a simplified approach to 
reform, which is informed by economic analysis, to determine how the USPS could encourage 
more economic development on the ground); Randall K. Johnson, Medical Malpractice 
Claims in Mississippi: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 MISS. C. L . REV. 191 (2015) (applying an 
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parking ticket appeals, is that residents of disadvantaged zip codes (i.e. majority-
Black zip codes, lower-income zip codes, or South Side zip codes) may have a 
distinct appeals rate, a different successful appeals rate, and a distinct win rate on 
appeal than the average local zip code (i.e. the mean, or numeric-average, of all 59 
zip codes) and that any observed difference could have implications for distributional 
fairness in Chicago. This Article acknowledges that there may be several plausible 
explanations for such a difference in treatment.37 It nonetheless accepts that the most 
compelling explanation may be the most straightforward one: that public employees 
may allow implicit biases to inform their decisions, especially if they know that valid 
administrative complaints will fall on deaf ears.38 If this explanation holds up, using 
percentage analysis, it may be assumed that the parking ticket appeals process may 
not be cost-justified: especially if measured in terms of the relationship between what 
is spent on detecting errors and the ticket error rates.39 
                                                                                                                 
 
arithmetic-based approach to determine where medical malpractice claims are filed in 
Mississippi); Johnson, supra note 29 (applying percentage analysis to determine who wins 
residential property tax appeals in Cook County); Randall K. Johnson, Why U.S. States Need 
Pension Waiver Credits, 40 S. ILL. U. L. J. 203 (2016) (applying a simplified approach to 
reform, which is informed by economic analysis, to determine how to overcome the fresh 
consideration dilemma that prevents some states from dealing with their public pension 
issues); Randall K. Johnson, Why Police Learn from Third-Party Data, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
ONLINE  (Supp. 2013), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2013/01/why-police-learn-from-
third-party-data/ [https://perma.cc/S6TN-HZVS] (applying a ratio-based approach to 
determine the nature of the relationship between third-party data collection and published 
§1983 cases); Johnson, supra note 26 (applying percentage analysis to determine if Chicago 
schools closed, disproportionately, in disadvantaged areas); Audrey G. McFarlane & Randall 
K. Johnson, Cities, Inclusion and Exactions, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2145 (2017) (applying a 
simplified approach to reform, which is informed by economic analysis to determine how 
much cities can ask of developers without running afoul of the Takings Clause); Randall K. 
Johnson, Why We Need a Comprehensive Recording Fraud Registry,  N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y QUORUM 88 (2014) (applying a simplified approach to reform, which is informed by 
economic analysis, so to determine how to limit recording fraud). 
 37. See also Pam Zekman, Thousands of Parking Tickets Issued Incorrectly in Chicago, 
CBS CHICAGO (Jun. 21, 2016), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2016/06/21/thousands-of-parking-
tickets-issued-incorrectly-in-chicago/ [https://perma.cc/BE4D-ZFWZ] (“Nearly 3,300 
parking tickets have been dismissed in the city over the last two years because they were 
incorrectly issued . . . [this incorrect imposition of a sanction applied to all] drivers who used 
the Park Chicago app [smartphone application] incorrectly.”). Other plausible explanations, 
which fall outside the scope of this paper, are the effect of other omitted variables such as 
relative rate of vehicle maintenance (i.e. whether the ability to conduct regular maintenance 
on a vehicle, which prevents breakdowns, helps to account for any observed differences in 
treatment). 
 38. See, e.g., Shane Shifflett, Alissa Scheller, Scilla Alecci & Nicky Forster, Police Abuse 
Complaints by Black Chicagoans Dismissed Nearly 99 Percent of the Time, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec. 7, 2015), http://data.huffingtonpost.com/2015/12/chicago-officer-misconduct-
allegations [https://perma.cc/8M3X-MD3V] (“Of 10,500 complaints filed by black people 
between 2011 and 2015, just 166—or 1.6 percent—were sustained or led to discipline after an 
internal investigation. Nationally, between 6 and 20 percent of [all] citizen-initiated 
complaints are sustained.”). 
 39. As such, it could be assumed that the parking ticket appeals process is a good example 
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This Article, in other words, assumes that if disadvantaged zip codes in Chicago 
have a different appeals rate (i.e. perceived error rate), a distinct successful appeals 
rate (i.e. actual error rate), or a different win rate on appeal (i.e. frequency that actual 
errors lead to dismissal of a parking ticket) than the average Chicago zip code, then 
its null hypothesis will be rejected (i.e. disadvantaged zip codes are not treated the 
same as other zips). Conversely, in the event that disadvantaged zip codes have the 
expected appeals rate (i.e. perceived error rate), the expected successful appeals rate 
(i.e. actual error rate), and the expected win rate on appeal (i.e. frequency that actual 
errors lead to dismissal of a parking ticket), then the null will not be rejected (i.e. 
disadvantaged zip codes are treated the same). Based on what is ultimately found by 
using percentage analysis, this Article may decide if there is uniform enforcement 
(i.e. Chicago does not discriminate with respect to how it distributes ticket or handles 
appeals) or more personalized application of the law (i.e. Chicago may discriminate 
in distributing tickets or handling appeals).  
One potential downside to using percentage analysis, at least as a valid test of 
distributional fairness, is that its findings could be affected by the fact that zip codes 
contain different numbers of people. This “size” issue, which may be referred to as 
a relative magnitude problem, is usually addressed by taking into account the 
possibility that having different numbers of people in a zip code may impact the 
distribution of tickets, appeals, and successful appeals. The Article deals with this 
issue by putting all fifty-nine Chicago zip codes on the same numeric scale by using 
percentage analysis to create standard units such as appeals rate, successful appeals 
rate, and win rate on appeal. The basic idea is that the appeals rate and successful 
appeals rate may be used to determine how much is spent in carrying out the parking 
ticket appeals process, whereas win rate on appeal helps to establish whether such 
costs are justified in light of the error rate at the individual, group and population 
levels. Such an approach may indicate that a seemingly-neutral process leads to an 
unjustified redistribution of public resources from one group of zip codes to another. 
Although this Article does not try to establish if any observed differences are 
statistically-significant, which is a valid way of determining how much confidence 
may be placed in a given research finding, it could serve as a point of departure for 
future work that does so using regression. Such work may go beyond the limited 
scope of my current Article, which focuses on whether there are any observable 
differences in terms of how disadvantaged zip codes and other Chicago zip codes are 
treated in the parking ticket appeals process. By doing so, hopefully using more 
reliable methods, future work may answer related questions such as “does Chicago 
enforce valid and final parking tickets in a uniform way?” 
This future work, much like the current Article, could identify public sector 
misconduct at a modest cost. Each may do so for three primary reasons. First, such 
scholarship operates as an early-warning system by putting U.S. governments on 
notice about questionable policies and practices. It also is easy for laypersons to use 
and understand, at least in comparison to more complex approaches such as 
regression. Lastly, each may encourage follow-up research, especially when authors 
fully describe their methodologies and provide immediate access to existing datasets. 
                                                                                                                 
 
of a neutral legal process that has hidden inefficiencies and inequitable outcomes. 
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As such, this Article is understood to be only one in a series of papers that could 
set the record straight about the type, quality, and quantity of information that U.S. 
governments may use to make more informed policy decisions. It does so by 
examining the parking ticket appeals process in Chicago: so as to gauge the 
uniformity, and the relative cost-effectiveness, of the parking ticket appeals process. 
The Article proceeds in five additional parts. Part II describes the applicable law. 
Part III explains this Article’s methodological approach, which employs percentage 
analysis to explain how parking tickets are distributed, how parking ticket appeals 
are distributed, and how frequently ticket recipients obtain relief in Chicago. Part IV 
outlines the Article's preliminary findings and positive analysis, which includes the 
fact that more advantaged zip codes have higher administrative costs and lower 
parking ticket error rates than disadvantaged zip codes. Part V contains its key 
normative recommendations. Part VI is the conclusion. 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED 
Budgetary issues have plagued the City of Chicago for a number of years.40 These 
problems arose from excessive spending, inaccurate financial estimates, and modest 
local government revenues. 41 The city’s issues, later, were made even worse by the 
recent worldwide recession.42 
The Great Recession, which began in 2007 and caused a significant reduction in 
local government revenues in the United States, forced Chicago to change its 
budgetary priorities.43 For example, the city has significantly reduced its spending 
by implementing cost controls.44 It also has improved its financial forecasting 
through the use of more realistic economic assumptions.45 Lastly, Chicago has 
sought to increase its own sources revenues by collecting more of its debts.46  
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. How Chicago Debt Exploded, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 2013, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-11-17/news/ct-edit-chicago-taxpayers-edit-1117-
20131117_1_pension-money-chicago-debt-police-and-fire-funds [https://perma.cc/G3YB-
QGDP] (“Decades of abuse and neglect by its political class leave Chicago with insufficient 
funds for necessities, let alone for smart extras.”). 
 41. Id. (“The most devastating sin in Chicago was arrogance—mayors and aldermen sure 
they could see the city’s economic future and, paradoxically, doubting that it ever could 
implode.”). 
 42. Id. (“[The damage caused by the Great Recession] is deep and prolonged because 
[Chicago] City Hall had spent, borrowed and promised so much that it couldn’t tolerate any 
revenue dips.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Fran Spielman, Emanuel’s 2017 Budget Address: “Chicago is Back on Solid 
Ground,” CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Oct. 11, 2016, http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/emanuels-
2017-budget-address-chicago-is-back-on-solid-ground/ [https://perma.cc/KA2G-M2QL] 
(“‘Chicago has regained its financial footing because city officials made some tough 
decisions,’ Mayor Rahm Emanuel said Tuesday in his 2017 budget address.”).  
 44. Id. (“The mayor’s budget assumes $148 million in revenue growth, driven by 
increases in sales, personal property lease tax and city sticker fees.”).  
 45. Id. (“Under the category titled ‘improved fiscal management,’ Emanuel anticipates 
generating $86.4 million by ‘sweeping aging revenue accounts, TIF reform’ and through 
investment reforms.”).  
 46. Id. (“The Chicago Sun-Times reported last week that Emanuel plans $30 million in 
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One example of an outstanding debt, which has traditionally gone under-
collected, is the local parking ticket.47 These $25 to $250 fines, often, are imposed 
for certain non-driving related violations.48 These fines, under the applicable law, are 
considered to be entirely civil in nature. 
Fully collecting parking ticket fines may be an effective way to improve 
Chicago’s long-term budgetary outlook,49 especially as it is a politically-viable 
alternative to tax increases or spending cuts.50 This approach also may have lower 
opportunity costs, which are defined as the “amount of other goods and services 
[that] . . . could have been obtained instead [of the selected option],”51 at least in 
comparison with unrealistic attempts to improve public sector efficiency.52 Lastly, it 
                                                                                                                 
 
‘targeted’ taxes, fines, and fees, even as it closes ‘loopholes’ and holds the line on property, 
sales, and gasoline taxes.”). 
 47. According to a number of different sources, the first U.S. parking ticket was awarded 
to the Reverend C.H. North of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma in 1935. E.g., The First Parking 
Ticket Issued in 1935, THE EXPIRED METER (Aug. 6, 2009), 
http://theexpiredmeter.com/2009/08/first-parking-ticket-issued-in-1935/ 
[https://perma.cc/83VA-NLUS]. 
 48. CITY OF CHICAGO, Parking, Compliance, and Automated Enforcement Violations   
(2018), 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/fin/supp_info/revenue/general_parking_ticketinf
ormation/violations.html [https://perma.cc/8TL3-S5J7] (describing the sanctions that may be 
imposed, which range from $25 to $250); CITY OF CHICAGO, Tips for Avoiding Parking Tickets   
(2018), 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/fin/supp_info/revenue/tips_for_avoidingparking
tickets.html [https://perma.cc/CQ3H-GM3D] (“There are other restrictions, not necessarily 
indicated by signs, that motorists are required to know. These violations include parking in a 
manner that impacts pedestrian safety, access for persons with disabilities, and traffic flow . . 
. Violation Descriptions: Park or Stand on Sidewalk [,] Park or Stand on Parkway [,] Park or 
Stand on Crosswalk [,] . . .  Improper Display of City Sticker [,] . . . Parking a Vehicle 6 Feet 
or Higher Within 20 Feet of a Crosswalk [,] . . . Parking a Vehicle for the Sole Purpose of 
Displaying the Vehicle for Sale [,] Parking a Vehicle to Make Repairs [,] Parking a Vehicle 
To Sell Merchandise [,] . . . Parking In An Alley [,] . . . Wrong Direction or 12 Inches from 
the Curb [,] . . . Parking Outside Diagonal Markings [,] . . . Snow Route: 2 Inches of Snow or 
More [,] . . . Non-Compliant License Plates [,] . . . Parking  Prohibited In a Viaduct or 
Underpass.”). 
 49. See Mary Wisniewski, You Can Leave Chicago, but Parking Tickets Are Forever, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 23, 2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/ct-
parking-tickets-getting-around-20170123-column.html [https://perma.cc/G9CS-KS67] (“The 
city needs money, and there is the legal maxim of Nullum tempus occurrit regi, which means 
‘No time runs against the king.’ [This maxim explains why there] is no Illinois statute of 
limitations for murder, arson or parking tickets.”).  
 50. See, e.g., Iris J. Lav & Dylan Grundman, A Balanced Approach to Closing State 
Deficits, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 25, 2011), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-16-10sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E7V-
T8WH] (describing how increased efficiency is one of the few “options available . . . outside 
of the . . . ‘either-or’ framework of tax increases and spending cuts.”).  
 51. Opportunity Cost, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2012). 
 52. See Spielman, supra note 43 (“‘For too long Chicago was not honest with taxpayers . 
. . about the true cost of [public goods and services] and we allowed dishonesty to turn into a 
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may lead to more compliance if similarly-situated drivers are treated in a standard 
way with respect to the distribution of tickets, appeals and who wins on appeal.53 
Currently, it is unclear if similarly-situated drivers are treated in a completely 
uniform way with respect to how parking tickets are distributed, appealed, resolved, 
and collected upon in Chicago.54 For example, out of the billions of dollars in 
revenues that could have been generated through parking ticket fines, untold amounts 
have gone uncollected.55 This under-collection has gone on for a long time, although 
the scale of lost revenues has increased in recent years.56 Over $1.5 billion is 
estimated to have been left on the table, which represents a fifteen percent increase 
since 2011.57 
Another type of government failure may arise from the city’s use of a “liberal” 
appeals process,58 which permits every parking ticket recipient to challenge their 
fine, even when there is a clear violation of the applicable law.59 This process, which 
guarantees ticket recipients a right to an administrative hearing, was authorized under 
                                                                                                                 
 
real financial burden.’”).  
 53. See Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal 
Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement (Yale L. Sch. Pub. L 
Working Paper, No. 306, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2292517 [https://perma.cc/X7YB-
ANH2] (“The primary factor shaping decision acceptance . . . is the procedural justice of the 
process through which a decision was reached.”). 
 54. See generally Mike Brockway, $1.5 Billion in Unpaid Tickets Could Be Huge Cash 
Cow for Chicago, DNA INF (Mar. 31, 2015), 
https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20150331/downtown/15-billion-unpaid-tickets-could-be-
huge-cash-cow-for-chicago [https://perma.cc/99HQ-J6XN] (describing how increased 
collections could benefit Chicago).  
 55. Id. (“[Parking ticket] debt accrues at a pace of $1 million a week . . . far more than 
what the city collects.”). 
 56. Id. (“Chicago . . . collects [on “old” parking ticket] debt that dates to 1990.”).  
 57. Id. (“The amount of unpaid tickets and fines has grown to . . . $1.5 billion . . . The 
bulk of the debt, $1.3 billion, is unpaid parking tickets, a total that has increased by $177 
million, or 15 percent.”). 
 58. See CLIFFORD WINSTON, BROOKINGS INST., GOVERNMENT FAILURE VS. MARKET 
FAILURE: MICROECONOMICS POLICY RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 2–3 (2006), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20061003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5BGZ-Y5N9] (“Government failure [which is a type of a market failure] . . 
. arises when government has created inefficiencies because it should not have intervened in 
the first place or when it could have solved a given problem or set of problems more efficiently, 
that is, by generating greater net benefits.”). 
 59. See James M. Reilly, Joseph D. Condo & Matthew W. Beaudet, The Department of 
Administrative Hearings for the City of Chicago: A New Method of Municipal Code 
Enforcement, J NAT’L. ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 89, 104 (1998) (“Under [this process,] . . .  
parties must be afforded certain due process considerations, i.e., adequate notice; and an 
opportunity to be heard, present evidence and witnesses, and be represented by counsel.”). 
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65 ILCS § 5/1-2.1 and Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-010.60 It was created in the 
wake of a federal decision, Van Harken v. City of Chicago.61  
Under the regulations that govern the parking ticket appeals process, which 
require that a timely hearing request is filed with the Vehicle Hearings Division,62 
there is “a week-long period [each month] during which [parking ticket recipients] 
can come in for a hearing.”63 This monthly docket of cases, which was first used on 
January 1, 1997,64 permits the Department of Administrative Hearings to resolve 
over 200,000 parking ticket appeals each year, which makes up more than half of the 
administrative hearings that are undertaken every year.65  
In each administrative hearing, Chicago has the burden of proof and production 
with respect to establishing the validity of each parking ticket.66 Once this burden is 
met, using a preponderance of the evidence standard,67 a parking ticket recipient 
“shall be asked to enter a plea of ‘admit/liable’ or ‘deny/not liable,’ and may then 
provide evidence to rebut the [parking ticket].”68 Each ticket recipient, then, must 
produce legally-sufficient evidence in support of their position.69 Once a ticket 
recipient has done so, then closing arguments may be made by each of the parties.70  
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. Id. at 94, 96. (“Following the report of the Mayor’s Commission in June 1996, the 
city embarked on an ultimately successful quest for the passage of a state law authorizing 
municipalities to put in place a centralized process of administrative hearings. The law (65 
Illinois Compiled Statutes §5/1-2.1) gives Illinois home rule cities the ability to set up a single 
administrative hearing department to enforce those municipal ordinances that contain civil 
sanctions, and it provides for code hearing units, or divisions that hear certain parts of the 
municipal code.”). 
 61. 906 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1995), aff’d as modified, 103 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1241 (1997) (holding that parking violations are civil in nature and, 
therefore, the Due Process Clause is not the standard way to protect a defendant’s rights in an 
administrative hearing). While scholars and practitioners may not agree on how much process 
should be given, it can be agreed that the current process may encourage both excessive 
ticketing (by parking attendants) and unjustified appeals (by ticket recipients). 
 62. CITY OF CHICAGO, Contesting Tickets In-Person (Parking, Red Light and Automated 
Speed Enforcement) (2018), 
www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/fin/supp_info/revenue/challenging_tickets/contesting_i
n_person.html [https://perma.cc/6B9M-8ZH8] (“You have seven (7) days from the date of 
issuance . . . to contest the ticket. If neither a contest [nor a] payment is received, a second 
Notice of Violation is mailed allowing twenty-one (21) days to request a hearing.”).  
 63. Reilly, supra note 59, at 99. 
 64. Id. at 89 (“On January 1, 1997, Chicago’s Department of Administrative Hearings 
began operations.”). 
 65. Id. at 99. 
 66. Id. at 106 (“The city bears the initial burden of proof in the case, and the standard is 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See generally Charles S. Beach II, The Chicago Traffic Court: Procedures and 
Practices 8-1 in DEFENDING DUI AND RELATED CASES, VOLUME II, General Editors: Ernest R. 
Blomquist III and Thomas M. Moran, ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 
(2014) (describing how to introduce evidence into the record). 
 70. Reilly, supra note 59, at 106 (“Each party may be afforded the opportunity to make a 
closing argument.”). 
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A parking ticket recipient, often, produces documentary evidence in an attempt to 
raise a valid defense or privilege.71 There are only a few valid excuses, however, 
which include: the ticket recipient is not the proper party, there are extenuating 
circumstances, the law is vague or ambiguous, there was a mistake on the part of the 
parking attendant, or a ticket recipient had addressed the issue before a ticket is 
issued.72 Excuses must be raised in a timely manner.73  
Upon completion of each hearing, which may be adjudicated in-person or by 
mail,74 the ticket recipient is notified of a final decision.75 Each final decision, which 
must be submitted in writing by an administrative law officer and made available to 
each of the parties, may be appealed as of right.76 A timely appeal must be filed, in 
the proper place, within thirty-five days of a final decision.77 
Traditionally, scholarly examinations of the current appeals process asks whether 
parking tickets have any effect on driver behavior.78 Other academic research tests 
the relationship between parking tickets and public finance.79 A third line of work 
focuses on how ticket enforcement may be impacted by prevailing social norms.80 A 
final category of investigation asks whether the current process encourages 
misconduct, especially if parking attendants do not fear being caught.81 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. CITY OF CHICAGO, supra note 62 (“The following defenses are allowed for most . . . 
tickets: 1. The respondent was not the owner or lessee of the cited vehicle at the time of the 
violation; 2. The cited vehicle or its state registration plates (license plates) were stolen at the 
time of the violation; 3. The relevant signs prohibiting or restricting parking were missing or 
obscured; 4. The relevant parking meter was inoperable or malfunctioned through no fault of 
the respondent; 5. The facts alleged in the parking . . . violation notice are inconsistent or do 
not support a finding that the specified regulation was violated . . . ; 6. The illegal vehicle 
condition did not exist at the time of the compliance violation; 7. The compliance violation 
has been corrected prior to adjudication.”).  
 73. Id. 
 74. Reilly, supra note 59, at 107 (“Due to the volume in the Vehicle Hearings Division, 
a respondent may elect to contest an alleged violation by mail rather than at an administrative 
hearing.”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. CITY OF CHICAGO, supra note 62 (“If [a parking ticket recipient is] dissatisfied with 
the Administrative Law Officer’s decision, [she] can appeal . . . under Administrative Review 
in the Circuit Court of Cook County.”). 
 77. Id. (“This option must be exercised within 35 days of the Administrative Law 
Officer’s decision.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Dara Lee Luca, Do Traffic Tickets Reduce Motor Vehicle Accidents? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 34 J. POL’Y. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 86, 86 (2014) (“This 
paper exploits exogenous variation in the number of tickets issued to identify the causal impact 
of traffic tickets in motor vehicle accidents using . . . data from Massachusetts.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: 
Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J. L. & ECON. 71, 72 (2009) 
(“[W]e utilize county-level data from North Carolina . . . to test . . . if changes in the issuance 
of traffic tickets are influenced by changes in local government fiscal health.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, Corruption, Norms, and Legal 
Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020 (2007) 
(explaining how diplomats are not required to pay tickets). 
 81. See, e.g., Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A 
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This scholarship, however, does not answer a basic research question: who wins 
parking ticket appeals in Chicago? This question is important because it explains 
how parking tickets and appeals are distributed across the city and the treatment that 
is experienced by different zip codes. Furthermore, it also could gauge the uniformity 
and the relative cost-effectiveness of the parking ticket appeals process in Chicago. 
Thus, the mere act of answering this question may help to explain whether there is 
uniform treatment or some personalization of the municipal parking laws over time. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This Article introduces a new City of Chicago dataset, which counsels for 
increased scrutiny of the parking ticket appeals process. It does so, initially, by 
collecting and combining parking ticket data that has been recently released by the 
Department of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Finance.82 These 
combined data, then, are used to compute several useful statistics: parking ticket 
appeals by zip code, successful appeals by zip code, and win rate on appeal by zip 
code.83 Lastly, the Article contextualizes each statistic, so as to determine if some 
zip codes are treated different than predicted by the null hypothesis (i.e. the group-
level average differs from the population average in terms of how parking tickets are 
appealed [appeals rate and successful appeals rate] and resolved [win rate on 
appeal]). 
A single methodological approach is used to determine if there are any observable 
differences, as between specific groups of zip codes and the average Chicago zip 
code, which is referred to in this paper as “percentage analysis.”84 This approach 
“consists of reducing a series of related amounts to a series of percentages of a given 
base.”85 Depending upon the characteristics of these related amounts, the unit of 
analysis may be a percentage86 or a rate.87 In this Article, the primary units of analysis 
are rates (i.e. appeals rate, successful appeals rate, and win rate on appeal). 
                                                                                                                 
 
Government of Men, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 425, 427 (2002) (“This Article addresses the 
apparent gap in the legal and social science literature concerning the unequal enforcement of 
traffic laws. How extensive do the police abuse the discretionary powers they are afforded?”). 
 82. See City of Chicago, Department of Administrative Hearings, RESPONSE TO FREEDOM 
OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST (Dec. 19, 2016) (“This is a response to your FOIA request 
received by the Department of Administrative Hearings on December 5th.”); See City of 
Chicago, Department of Finance, RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST 
(Sept. 14, 2017) (“On behalf of the Department of Finance, I am responding to your Freedom 
of Information Act (‘FOIA’) request.”). 
 83. See infra Appendix at Tables D, E, and F. 
 84. Cf. Johnson, supra note 29; Johnson, supra note 26. 
 85. Basic Financial Statement Analysis, WILEY.COM (2014), 
http://www.wiley.com/college/kieso/0471363049/dt/analysttool/faprimer/fap11.htm 
[https://perma.cc/62PM-P5LX].  
 86. See Joseph F. Healey, STATISTICS: A TOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 508 (6th ed., 2002) 
(“[A percentage is] . . . the number of cases in a category divided by the number of cases in 
all categories, the entire quantity multiplied by 100.”). 
 87. Id. (“[A rate is] . . . the number of actual occurrences divided by the number of 
possible occurrences per some unit of time.”). 
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This Article defines “appeals rate” as the perceived error rate, at least from the 
perspective of people that received parking tickets during the study period. Similarly, 
“successful appeals rate” is defined as the actual error rate, as decided by the 
Department of Administrative Hearings. “Win rate on appeal,” lastly, is a function 
of the first two concepts since it refers to the frequency that a parking ticket was 
issued in error and the ticket recipient was entitled to have their sanction overturned. 
These rates are computed, initially, at the population level (i.e. all fifty-nine zip 
codes in Chicago).88 Next, each is computed at the group level (i.e. the sixteen zip 
codes with majority-black residents and the forty-three zip codes with majority non-
black residents; the twenty-eight zip codes that are located in lower-income areas 
and the thirty-one zip codes that are located in higher-income areas; as well as the 
twenty-five zip codes that are located on the South Side and the thirty-four zip codes 
that are located on the North Side).89 The final computation is at the individual level 
(i.e. the zip code location of ticket recipients).90 All computations are done, using 
Microsoft Excel, and included in the Appendix. 
Percentage analysis is used for at least three reasons. First, the approach is 
“helpful in evaluating the relative size of items or the relative change in items.”91 
Percentage analysis also provides “a useful way of comparing fractions with different 
denominators.”92 Lastly, the approach could lay “a solid foundation for discussing . 
. . more complicated . . . [empirical] issues.”93 
This approach, however, will not be useful if the article does not account for a 
range of potential issues.94 Several issues are dealt with deliberately. Selection 
effects, which are defined as a type of “statistical bias in which there is an error in 
choosing the individuals or groups to take part in a scientific study,” are accounted 
for by testing every zip code in Chicago.95 Omitted variables, which are defined as 
an issue that “occurs when [variables that are not included in the study] . . . affect the 
relationship between the dependent variable and included explanatory variables,” are 
dealt with by testing all fifty-nine Chicago zip codes at the population, group, and 
individual levels.96 Other issues were completely avoided, such as relative magnitude 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. See infra Appendix at Tables D, E, and F. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Basic Financial Statement Analysis, supra note 85. 
 92. PETER BROWN, MICHAEL EVANS, DAVID HUNT, JANINE MCINTOSH, BILL PENDER, & 
JACQUI RAMAGGE, INT’L. CTR. EXCELLENCE IN MATHEMATICS, PERCENTAGES: A GUIDE FOR 
TEACHERS 4 (2011). 
 93. Jessica Polito, The Language of Comparisons: Communicating about Percentages, 7 
NUMERACY 14 (2014), http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/numeracy/vol7/iss1/art6 
[https://perma.cc/TT3T-Y6XY]. 
 94. See, e.g., John Antonakis, Samuel Bendahan, Philippe Jacquart & Rafael Lalive, On 
Making Causal Claims: A Review and Recommendations, 21 LEADERSHIP Q. 1086 (2010) 
(describing the various methodological issues that may arise in social science research, 
especially in cases where an author seeks to make some causal claim). 
 95. Pam M.S. Nugent, Selection Bias, PSYCHOLOGY DICTIONARY: PROFESSIONAL 
REFERENCE (2013), https://psychologydictionary.org/selection-bias/ [https://perma.cc/BCB7-
NFWJ]. 
 96. Jonathan E. Leightner & Tomoo Inoue, Solving the Omitted Variables Problem of 
Regression Analysis Using the Relative Vertical Position of Observations, 2012 ADVANCES 
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problems, since this Article accounts for the fact that zip codes may not be the same 
in important dimensions. It does so by putting each zip code, and group of zip codes, 
on the same scale by using percentage analysis to create standard units such as 
appeals rate, successful appeals rate, and win rate on appeal. 
As such, as Professor James Lindgren explained in an article about whether there 
is distributional fairness by race, gender, ethnicity, and religion on certain law school 
faculties: 
The crucial issue here is not disadvantaged groups, but underrepresented 
ones . . . Proportional representation is considered the approximate test 
of fairness, though few people urge exact proportional representation. 
The goal is a roughly equal distribution of demographic groups . . . [, as] 
significant underrepresentation of groups is typically assumed to be the 
result of discrimination.97 
One way to determine if the underrepresentation of disadvantaged groups stems 
from disfavored forms of discrimination, such as when discrimination is based upon 
characteristics such as race, income, or location, is to employ a valid application of 
percentage analysis as a test of allocational fairness. In contrast, percentage analysis 
also could be used as a gauge for distributional fairness, especially when used to 
establish whether overrepresentation or underrepresentation arises from unlawful 
discrimination. Within this context, this Article adopts the second approach so as to 
determine how disadvantaged zip codes are treated in Chicago and if any observable 
differences may be detected on the basis of race, income, or location in the target 
population. 
                                                                                                                 
 
DECISION SCI. 728980 (2012), https://www.hindawi.com/journals/ads/2012/728980/ 
[https://perma.cc/5WSB-V6WB]. This Article acknowledges that there are a number of 
possibly relevant variables, but it focuses upon the considerations that are most important for 
purposes of scholarly discussion. 
 97. James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013, 39 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y. 89, 100–01 (2016). This Article accepts the possibility that small differences 
in treatment actually could matter, especially if the test for justice is allocational fairness rather 
than distributional fairness. Within this context, allocational fairness is defined to mean that 
justice is a function of the closeness of fit between the total contribution that is made by an 
individual citizen (such as taxes, user fees, and other payments that are transferred from a legal 
person to a government) and that the total benefits that are received in exchange from a 
government (such as public goods, public services, and other public benefits that are 
transferred from a government to a legal person). In cases where a citizen gives up more than 
she receives, then there is a deficit and this person receives less than their fair share. If a citizen 
receives more than they give up, then there is a subsidy and this person receives more than 
their fair share. When the amount that is paid by a citizen is exactly equal to the amount that 
is received, then there a complete offset and that person gets their fair share. The first two 
illustrations are examples of unjust outcomes, whereas the third illustration is an example of a 
more just outcome, at least when allocational fairness serves as the test for fairness. 
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IV. FINDINGS 
This section draws on information about a subset of the twelve million parking 
tickets that were issued between fiscal years 2012 and 2016.98 Next, it combines this 
data with other publicly-available data to compute several useful statistics.99 Finally, 
the Article contextualizes each statistic: so as to find out if disadvantaged zip codes 
are treated the same as more advantaged zip codes in the study period.  
 The baseline for analysis is the average Chicago zip code, as determined by the 
use of the mean for the entire population of fifty-nine zip codes, which is estimated 
to have an appeals rate of 13.52 percent (i.e. the perceived error rate), a successful 
appeals rate of 8.44 percent (i.e. the actual error rate), and a win rate on appeal of 
62.38 percent (i.e. the frequency that actual errors lead to dismissal of a parking 
ticket).  
For the purposes of this Article, whether a group of zip codes is treated in a 
uniform way depends on if its group level average is exactly the same as the overall 
population average. As such, despite the fact that this Article does not try to 
determine if any observed differences are actually statistically significant, it is 
important to keep in mind that this preliminary finding is still useful, as it may serve 
as a point of departure for future work that does so using regression. For example, 
this future work could use t-test, analysis of variance or another method, in order to 
determine if any observed differences are actually statistically significant. 100   
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. See Brockway, supra note 54 (“Chicago issues an average of 2.4 million parking 
tickets annually [, regardless of whether the ticket recipient lives in the area].”). This Article 
focuses solely upon the 6,496,114 parking tickets that were issued to Chicagoland drivers, the 
813,286 parking ticket appeals that were filed by Chicagoland drivers, and 510,234 successful 
parking ticket appeals that were ultimately granted to Chicagoland drivers between 2012 and 
2016. 
 99. See Department of Administrative Hearings, supra note 82; See Department of 
Finance, supra note 82. This Article actually includes information about both the mean and 
the median. The information about the mean is discussed in the text, whereas the information 
about the median is found in the footnotes. See infra Appendix at Tables D, E, and F. Cf. 
Johnson, supra note 26, at 515–16 (“The mean is the average of a series of numbers, whereas 
the median is the middle number. The mean and the median are both valid measures of central 
tendency, although their value often depends on the research question . . . The mean and the 
median are used for several, inter-related reasons. First, it is unclear whether [parking tickets, 
parking ticket appeals, and successful ticket appeals] . . . are skewed or normally distributed. 
Next, the uncertainty about the distribution . . . counsels for the use of the mean and the 
median. Lastly, these measures provide a wealth of information, especially about 
disproportionate treatment within a sample population.”). 
 100. An example of how this future research could be undertaken is provided by recent 
studies of the residential property tax appeals process, which employ coefficients of dispersion 
as part of more sophisticated empirical analyses. See Civic Consulting Alliance Board: An 
Affiliate Of The Civil Committee Of The Commercial Club of 
Chicago, Residential Property Assessment In Cook County: Summary Of Analytical Findings, 
Unpublished Manuscript, Page 9, Note 1 (2018), https://www.ccachicago.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/02/2018-Residential-Property-Analysis-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KDK- 
WXYK] (“From the International Assessing Officers’ (IAAO) standard on ratio studies. ‘The 
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A. Race 
Chicago has 850,821 residents of African Descent, which makes up about thirty-
two percent of its 2,704,958 residents.101 These residents of African Descent (i.e. 
blacks), in comparison to residents of non-black extraction (others), are largely 
concentrated in a few zip codes.102 There are sixteen majority-black zip codes, 
whereas there are forty-three majority-other zip codes. 
The 16 zip codes with a majority of black residents, at least when compared to the 
total population of 59 Chicago zip codes, experienced different treatment than 
predicted by the null hypothesis.103 For example, the average majority-black zip code 
had an appeals rate 12.37 percent versus 13.52 percent for the average Chicago zip 
code.104 The average majority-black zip code went on to have a successful appeals 
rate of 7.83 percent, in comparison to 8.44 percent for the average Chicago zip 
code.105 The result is that the 16 zip codes with a majority of black residents are 
underrepresented in terms of their appeals rate (-1.15 percentage points) and 
successful appeals rate (-0.61 percentage points), as compared to the average 
Chicago zip code.106 
                                                                                                                 
 
most generally useful measure of variability or uniformity is the COD [i.e. coefficient of 
dispersal]. The COD measures the average percentage deviation of the 
ratios from the median ratio.’”); See Shekhar Mehta and Fred Giertz, Measuring the 
Performance of the Property Tax Assessment Process, 49 Nat. Tax J. 73, 83, Note 83 (1996), 
https://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/49/1/ntj-v49n01p73-85-measuring-performance-property-
tax.pdf?v=%CE%B1 [https://perma.cc/85M5-LMTK] (“The coefficient of 
dispersion is given by the following formula: (∑|a i /s i – (a/s) med |)/n(a/s) med . It is the 
average deviation of the actual sales assessment ratios (i.e., the ratio of assessed value (a) to 
actual selling price (s) as measured by sales assessment studies) from the median ratio (a/s) 
med divided by the overall median ratio.”) 
 101. See U.S. Census, American Fact Finder, 2011–2015 ACS SURVEY 5–YEAR 
ESTIMATES (2017). 
 102. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-1 with infra Appendix at Table D-2; Compare 
infra Appendix at Table E-1 with infra Appendix at Table E-2; Compare infra Appendix at 
Table F-1 with infra Appendix at Table F-2. There were 2,172,578 parking tickets issued to 
residents of majority-black zip codes, 269,492 parking ticket appeals filed by residents of these 
zip codes, and 170,895 successful appeals by residents of these zip codes. In contrast, there 
were 4,323,536 parking tickets issued to residents of majority-other zip codes, 543,794 
parking ticket appeals filed by residents of these zip codes, and 339,339 successful appeals by 
residents of these zip codes. See Department of Administrative Hearings, supra note 82; See 
Department of Finance, supra note 82. 
 103. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-1 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-1 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-
1 with infra Appendix at Table F. 
 104. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-1 with infra Appendix at Table D. If medians are 
used, the average majority-black zip code has an appeals rate of 12.88 percent and the average 
Chicago zip code has an appeals rate of 13.16 percent. 
 105. Compare infra Appendix at Table E-1 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are 
used, the average majority-black zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.08 percent and the 
average Chicago zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.31 percent. 
 106. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-1 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-1 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are used, the difference is 
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The 43 zip codes with less than a majority of black residents, similarly, 
experienced different treatment than predicted by the null hypothesis.107 For 
example, the average majority-other zip code had an appeals rate of 13.95 percent 
versus 13.52 percent for the average Chicago zip code.108 The average majority-other 
zip code, then, went on to have a successful appeals rate of 8.66 percent in 
comparison to 8.44 percent for the average Chicago zip code.109 The result is that the 
43 zip codes with less than a majority of black residents are overrepresented, in terms 
of their appeals rate (+0.43 percentage points) and successful appeals rate (+0.22 
percentage points).110 
When win rates on appeal are considered, it is clear that both groups are treated 
differently from the average Chicago zip code.111 Specifically, the 16 majority-black 
zip codes had a win rate on appeal of 63.49 percent, the 43 non-black zip codes had 
a win rate on appeal of 61.97 and the average Chicago zip code had a win rate on 
appeal of 62.38 percent.112 As a result, both the 16 majority-black zip codes (+1.11 
percentage points) and the 43 zip codes with majority-other zip codes are not treated 
in exactly the same way (-.41 percentage points) as the average zip code.113 
                                                                                                                 
 
-.28 percentage points for the appeals rate and -.23 percentage points for the successful appeals 
rate. 
 107. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-2 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-2 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-
2 with infra Appendix at Table F. 
 108. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-2 with infra Appendix at Table D. If medians are 
used, the average majority-other zip code has an appeals rate of 14.59 percent and the average 
Chicago zip code has an appeals rate of 13.16 percent. 
 109. Compare infra Appendix at Table E-2 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are 
used, the average majority-other zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.49 percent and the 
average Chicago zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.31 percent. 
 110. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-2 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-2 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are used, the difference is 
+1.43 percentage points for the appeals rate and +.18 percentage points for the successful 
appeals rate. 
 111. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-1 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-1 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-
1 with infra Appendix at Table F; Compare infra Appendix at Table D-2 with infra Appendix 
at Table D; Compare infra Appendix at Table E-2 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare 
infra Appendix at Table F-2 with infra Appendix at Table F. 
 112. Compare infra Appendix at Table F-1 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are 
used, the average majority-black zip code has a win rate on appeal of 63.62 and the average 
Chicago zip code has a win rate on appeal of 63.13 percent; Compare infra Appendix at Table 
F-2 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are used, the average majority-other zip code 
has a win rate on appeal of 61.79 and the average Chicago zip code has a win rate on appeal 
of 63.13 percent. 
 113. Compare infra Appendix at Table F-1 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are 
used, the difference is +49 percentage points between the average majority-black zip code and 
the average Chicago zip code; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-2 with infra Appendix at 
Table F. If medians are used, the difference is -1.34 percentage points between the average 
majority-other zip code and the average Chicago zip code.  
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B. Income 
Chicago has a median household income of $48,522.114 Chicago residents that 
earn less than this amount (i.e. residents with lower-than-average incomes), and 
Chicago residents that earn more than $48,522 (i.e. residents with higher-than-
average incomes), often are segregated by zip code.115 There were 28 lower-income 
zip codes as well as 31 higher-income zip codes in Chicago.  
The 28 zip codes with lower-than-average incomes, at least when compared to the 
entire population of 59 Chicago zip codes, experienced different treatment than 
predicted by the null hypothesis.116 For example, the average lower-income zip code 
had an appeals rate 12.63 percent versus 13.52 percent for the average Chicago zip 
code.117 The average lower-income zip code went on to have a successful appeals 
rate of 8.11 percent, in comparison to 8.44 percent for the average Chicago zip 
code.118 The result is that the 28 zip codes with lower-than-average incomes are 
underrepresented in terms of their appeals rate (-0.89 percentage points) and 
successful appeals rate (-0.33 percentage points).119 
The 31 zip codes with higher-than-average incomes, similarly, experienced 
different treatment than predicted by the null hypothesis.120 For example, the average 
higher-income zip code had an appeals rate of 14.32 percent versus 13.52 percent for 
the average Chicago zip code.121 The average higher-income zip code, then, went on 
to have a successful appeals rate of 8.73 percent in comparison to 8.44 percent for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See U.S. Census, supra note 101. 
 115. Id. There were 4,098,836 parking tickets issued to residents of lower-income zip 
codes, 486,256 parking ticket appeals filed by residents of these zip codes, and 311,225 
successful appeals by residents of these zip codes. In contrast, there were 2,397,278 parking 
tickets issued to residents of higher-income zip codes, 327,030 parking ticket appeals filed by 
residents of these zip codes, and 199,009 successful appeals by residents of these zip codes. 
See Department of Administrative Hearings, supra note 82; See Department of Finance, supra 
note 82. 
 116. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-3 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-3 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-
3 with infra Appendix at Table F. 
 117. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-3 with infra Appendix at Table D. If medians are 
used, the average lower-income zip code has an appeals rate of 12.88 percent and the average 
Chicago zip code has an appeals rate of 13.16 percent. 
 118. Compare infra Appendix at Table E-3 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are 
used, the average lower-income zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.08 percent and the 
average Chicago zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.31 percent. 
 119. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-3 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-3 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are used, the difference is 
-.28 percentage points for the appeals rate and -.23 percentage points for the successful appeals 
rate. 
 120. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-4 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-4 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-
4 with infra Appendix at Table F. 
 121. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-4 with infra Appendix at Table D. If medians are 
used, the average higher-Income zip code has an appeals rate of 14.54 percent and the average 
Chicago zip code has an appeals rate of 13.16 percent. 
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the average Chicago zip code.122 The result is that the 31 zip codes with higher-than-
average incomes are overrepresented, in terms of their appeals rate (+0.80 percentage 
points) and successful appeals rate (+0.29 percentage points), as compared to the 
average zip code.123 
When win rates on appeal are considered, it is clear that both groups are treated 
differently from the average Chicago zip code.124 Specifically, the 28 lower-income 
zip codes had a win rate on appeal of 64.09 percent, the 31 higher-income zip codes 
had a win rate on appeal of 60.84, and the average Chicago zip code had a win rate 
on appeal of 62.38 percent.125 As a result, both the 28 lower-income zip codes (+1.71 
percentage points) and the 31 higher-income zip codes are not treated in exactly the 
same way (-1.54 percentage points) as the average Chicago zip code.126 
C. Location 
Chicago has long been segregated, especially based on location, which some 
researchers believe leads to differential provision of public goods and services.127 
The two major geographic areas in Chicago, which are separated by Madison Street, 
are the South Side and the North Side.128 Using this traditional dividing line, there 
are 25 South Side zip codes and 34 North Side zip codes. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Compare infra Appendix at Table E-4 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are 
used, the average higher-Income zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.47 percent and the 
average Chicago zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.31 percent. 
 123. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-4 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-4 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are used, the difference is 
+1.38 percentage points for the appeals rate and +.16 percentage points for the successful 
appeals rate. 
 124. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-1 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-1 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-
1 with infra Appendix at Table F; Compare infra Appendix at Table D-2 with infra Appendix 
at Table D; Compare infra Appendix at Table E-2 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare 
infra Appendix at Table F-2 with infra Appendix at Table F. 
 125. Compare infra Appendix at Table F-1 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are 
used, the average lower-income zip code has a win rate on appeal of 64.10 percent and the 
average Chicago zip code has a win rate on appeal of 63.13 percent; Compare infra Appendix 
at Table F-2 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are used, the average higher-income 
zip code has a win rate on appeal of 60.39 percent and the average Chicago zip code has a win 
rate on appeal of 63.13 percent. 
 126. Compare infra Appendix at Table F-1 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are 
used, the difference is +.97 percentage points between the average lower-income zip code and 
the average Chicago zip code; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-2 with infra Appendix at 
Table F. If medians are used, the difference is -2.73 percentage points between the average 
higher-income zip code and the average Chicago zip code. 
 127. See, e.g., Sampson, supra note 31, at 6 (“Spatially inscribed social differences, I 
argue, constitute a family of ‘neighborhood effects’ that are pervasive, strong, cross-cutting, 
and paradoxically stable even as they are changing in manifest form."). 
 128. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHICAGO, Street Naming, CHICAGOHISTORY.ORG (2005), 
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/1205.html [https://perma.cc/872G-
VMYF] (In 1901, building superintendent Edward P. Brennan … suggested that Chicago be 
ordered as a large grid with a uniform street numbering system, and proposed State and 
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The 25 zip codes that are entirely on the South Side, at least when compared to 
the full population of 59 Chicago zip codes, are not treated in exactly the same way 
as the average local zip code.129 For example, the average South Side zip code had 
an appeals rate of 12.51 percent versus 13.52 percent for the average Chicago zip 
code.130 The average South Side zip code went on to have a successful appeals rate 
of 7.76 percent, in comparison to 8.44 percent for the average Chicago zip code.131 
The result is that the 25 zip codes that are entirely on the South Side are 
underrepresented in terms of their appeals rate (-1.01 percentage points) and 
successful appeals rate (-0.68 percentage points).132 
The remaining 34 zip codes that are on the North Side, similarly, are not treated 
in exactly the same way.133 For example, the average North Side zip code had an 
appeals rate of 14.26 percent versus 13.52 percent for the average Chicago zip 
code.134 The average North Side zip code, then, went on to have a successful appeals 
rate of 8.94 percent in comparison to 8.44 percent for the average Chicago zip 
code.135 The result is that the 34 North Side zip codes are overrepresented, in terms 
of their appeals rate (+0.74 percentage points) and successful appeals rate (+.50 
percentage points), as compared to the average Chicago zip code.136 
                                                                                                                 
 
Madison Streets as the city’s primary north-south and east-west axes.”). There were 3,100,115 
parking tickets issued to residents of South Side zip codes, 357,840 parking ticket appeals filed 
by residents of these zip codes, and 224,075 successful appeals by residents of these zip codes. 
In contrast, there were 3,395,999 parking tickets issued to residents of North Side zip codes, 
455,446 parking ticket appeals filed by residents of these zip codes, and 286,159 successful 
appeals by residents of these zip codes. See Department of Administrative Hearings, supra 
note 82; See Department of Finance, supra note 82. 
 129. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-5 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-5 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-
5 with infra Appendix at Table F. 
 130. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-5 with infra Appendix at Table D. If medians are 
used, the average South Side zip code has an appeals rate of 13.06 percent and the average 
Chicago zip code has an appeals rate of 13.16 percent. 
 131. Compare infra Appendix at Table E-5 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are 
used, the average South Side zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.14 percent and the 
average Chicago zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.31 percent. 
 132. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-5 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-5 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are used, the difference is 
-.10 percent for the appeals rate and -.17 percent for the successful appeals rate. 
 133. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-6 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-6 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-
6 with infra Appendix at Table F. 
 134. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-6 with infra Appendix at Table D. If medians are 
used, the average North Side zip code has an appeals rate of 14.72 percent and the average 
Chicago zip code has an appeals rate of 13.16 percent. 
 135. Compare infra Appendix at Table E-6 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are 
used, the average North Side zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.56 percent and the 
average Chicago zip code has a successful appeals rate of 8.31 percent. 
 136. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-6 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-6 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are used, the difference is 
+1.56 percentage points for the appeals rate and +.25 percentage points for the successful 
appeals rate. 
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When win rates on appeal are considered, it is clear that both groups are treated 
in almost the same way as the average Chicago zip code.137 Specifically, the 25 South 
Side zip codes had a win rate on appeal of 62.26 percent, the 34 North Side zip codes 
had a win rate on appeal of 62.47, and the average Chicago zip code had a win rate 
on appeal of 62.38 percent.138 As a result, both the 25 South Side zip codes (-0.12 
percentage points) and the 34 North Side zip codes are treated in a substantially-
similar way (+.09 percentage points) to the average Chicago zip code.139 
V. ANALYSIS 
This Article finds that all three groups of disadvantaged zip codes, the 16 
majority-black zip codes, the 28 lower-income zip codes, and the 25 South Side zip 
codes are underrepresented with respect to almost every measure of distributional 
fairness.140 These findings arise from the fact that all three groups of zip codes are 
treated differently than the average Chicago zip code, except in the case of the South 
Side zip codes’ win rate on appeal.141 Thus, it is clear that the Article’s null 
hypothesis is almost always rejected with respect to the 16 majority-black zip codes, 
the 28 lower-income zip codes, and the 25 South Side zip codes, which is to say that 
there may have been some “personalization” of the law during the study period. The 
surprise is how disadvantaged zip codes were treated differently; there was a lower 
appeals rate, a lower successful appeals rate than expected for each, and a higher win 
rate on appeal than expected for two of the three groups of zip codes. 
 These findings indicate that more advantaged zip codes may have higher 
administrative costs, and lower parking ticket error rates, than disadvantaged zip 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-1 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-1 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-
1 with infra Appendix at Table F; Compare infra Appendix at Table D-2 with infra Appendix 
at Table D; Compare infra Appendix at Table E-2 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare 
infra Appendix at Table F-2 with infra Appendix at Table F. 
 138. Compare infra Appendix at Table F-1 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are 
used, the average South Side zip code has a win rate on appeal of 63.13 percent and the average 
Chicago zip code has a win rate on appeal of 63.13 percent; Compare infra Appendix at Table 
F-2 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are used, the average North Side zip code has 
a win rate on appeal of 63.02 percent and the average Chicago zip code has a win rate on 
appeal of 63.13 percent. 
 139. Compare infra Appendix at Table F-1 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are 
used, the difference is 0 between the average South Side zip code and the average Chicago zip 
code; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-2 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are 
used, the difference is -.11 percentage points between the average North Side zip code and the 
average Chicago zip code. 
 140. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-1 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra 
Appendix at Table E-1 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-
1 with infra Appendix at Table F; Compare infra Appendix at Table D-3 with infra Appendix 
at Table D; Compare infra Appendix at Table E-3 with infra Appendix at Table E; Compare 
infra Appendix at Table F-3 with infra Appendix at Table F; Compare infra Appendix at Table 
D-5 with infra Appendix at Table D; Compare infra Appendix at Table E-5 with infra 
Appendix at Table E; Compare infra Appendix at Table F-5 with infra Appendix at Table F. 
 141. Id. 
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codes during the study period. Therefore, it stands to reason that the parking ticket 
appeals process may be more cost-justified for disadvantaged zip codes than for more 
advantaged zip codes in Chicago, at least when cost is measured in terms of the 
relationship between what is being spent in detecting errors (the sum of 
administrative costs, such as the initial set-up costs and the recurring costs of carrying 
out appeals work, which may be understood to be functions of the appeals rate and 
successful appeals rate) and what is spent in correcting errors (the cost of dealing 
with errors in ticket issuance, which are functions of win rate on appeal.) 
The normative implications, in contrast, are much more straightforward. For 
example, Chicago should find out why disadvantaged zip codes appeal less than 
would be predicted, according to this Article’s null hypothesis, despite the fact that 
two of the three groups had higher win rates on appeal, so as to eliminate any 
unaccounted barriers to filing a parking ticket appeal. It also should identify some of 
the possible reasons that disadvantaged zip codes had a lower successful appeals rate 
than expected, perhaps by asking if public employees acted on implicit biases or in 
keeping with their training.142 Lastly, Chicago should undertake random audits: so 
as to detect any patterns of discrimination that may explain the differences in win 
rates on appeal.  
Discrimination in appeal decisions, regardless of if it is due to intentional or 
negligent conduct, should not be tolerated. There are three reasons why, which are 
informed by concerns about the incentive structure for public sector employees. First, 
any tolerance of unlawful discrimination encourages moral hazard or the idea that 
individuals “are less likely to take good care . . . than if they were uninsured [against 
loss].”143 It also may prevent the parking ticket appeals process from becoming 
horizontally and vertically equitable, which are two ways of assuring uniform 
treatment.144 Lastly, the tolerance of discrimination increases transaction costs or 
“the cost[s] incurred in undertaking an economic exchange.”145 As a result, if all 
three reforms are taken up, the parking ticket appeals process could become a true 
exemplar of fairness. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. See Lisa Parker, City Law Judge Who Handles Parking Ticket Appeals Gets Retrained 
After Investigation, NBC CHICAGO (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/The-Uphill-Battle-to-Prove-Parking-Tickets-
Unfair-291346331.html (“An investigation of the city’s parking ticket appeals process . . . has 
resulted in the ‘retraining’ of an attorney that handles thousands of parking ticket cases every 
year.”).  
 143. See supra note 51, at 270. 
 144. Similar concerns about unjustified grants of relief have been raised with respect to 
property tax appeals. See, e.g., Rachel N. Weber & Daniel P. McMillen, Ask and Ye Shall 
Receive? Predicting the Successful Appeal of Property Tax Assessments, 38 PUB. FIN. REV. 74 
(2010) ("Appeals could make property tax assessments less uniform and violate the principle 
of horizontal equity, which assumes that two taxpayers with identical houses receive the same 
assessment . . . Appeals also could make the distribution of the property tax less vertically 
equitable and even 'regressive' if applications and successful appeals were correlated with 
higher-valued properties—either because owners of higher-valued homes were more likely to 
appeal or because assessors were more likely to grant relief."). 
 145. See supra note 51, at 414.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article finds that disadvantaged zip codes, regardless of whether 
disadvantaged is defined in terms of race, income, or location, often are treated 
differently than the average Chicago zip code. This finding is based initially on the 
fact that the 16 majority-black zip codes had less than the expected parking ticket 
appeals rate (-1.15 percentage points),146 less than the expected successful appeals 
rate (-0.61 percentage points),147 and more than the expected win rate on appeal 
(+1.11 percentage points).148 It also is supported by the fact that the 28 lower-income 
zip codes also had less than the expected parking ticket appeals rate (-0.89 percentage 
points),149 less than the expected successful appeals rate (-0.33 percentage points),150 
and more than the expected win rate on appeal (+1.71 percentage points).151 Finally, 
it is further substantiated by the fact that the 25 South Side zip codes had less than 
the expected parking ticket appeals rate (-1.01 percentage points),152 less than the 
expected successful appeals rate (-0.68 percentage points),153 and about the same 
expected win rate on appeal (-0.12 percentage points).154 The Article, therefore, 
concludes that disadvantaged zip codes often are treated differently, albeit in 
unexpected ways (i.e. there was a lower appeals rate and lower successful appeals 
rate than expected for all three disadvantaged groups, as well as a higher win rate on 
appeal than expected for two of the three disadvantaged groups).  
This preliminary conclusion indicates that there may have been some 
personalization of the law and that such an approach is not cost-justified. More 
research, however, is needed to find out whether personalization actually leads to 
statistically-significant differences in terms of how zip codes are treated in Chicago. 
This research should be sure to account for the fact that the type of parking ticket, 
the dollar amount of each parking ticket and the theory of the case on appeal may 
yield useful insights into why there may be observed differences in the treatment 
received by zip codes over time. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-1 with infra Appendix at Table D. If medians are 
used, the difference is -.28 percentage points for the appeals rate. 
 147. Compare infra Appendix at Table E-1 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are 
used, the difference is -.23 percentage points for the successful appeals rate. 
 148. Compare infra Appendix at Table F-1 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are 
used, the difference is +.49 percentage points for the win rate on appeal. 
 149. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-3 with infra Appendix at Table D. If medians are 
used, the difference is -.28 percentage points for the appeals rate. 
 150. Compare infra Appendix at Table E-3 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are 
used, the difference is -.23 percentage points for the successful appeals rate. 
 151. Compare infra Appendix at Table F-3 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are 
used, the difference is +.97 percentage points for the win rate on appeal. 
 152. Compare infra Appendix at Table D-5 with infra Appendix at Table D. If medians are 
used, the difference is -.10 percentage points for the appeals rate. 
 153. Compare infra Appendix at Table E-5 with infra Appendix at Table E. If medians are 
used, the difference is -.17 percentage points for the successful appeals rate. 
 154. Compare infra Appendix at Table F-5 with infra Appendix at Table F. If medians are 
used, the difference is 0 for the win rate on appeal. 
2018] UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OR PERSONALIZED LAW ?  61 
 
  
 
 
 
PART VII: APPENDIX 
 
A. Parking Tickets, By All 59 City of Chicago Zip Codes, Fiscal Years 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 3,374 3,421 2,853 2,913 3,055 15,616 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 811 701 638 605 617 3,372 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 571 656 586 550 564 2,927 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 550 539 578 541 614 2,822 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 8,387 7,678 6,868 7,419 7,023 37,375 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 1,573 1,575 1,351 1,311 1,254 7,064 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 11,291 11,403 10,876 10,779 10,161 54,510 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 39,590 40,762 38,409 38,814 37,270 194,845 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 32,537 36,072 30,915 34,632 30,369 164,525 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 14,634 14,697 13,308 13,677 13,228 69,544 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 7,737 8,000 7,087 6,533 6,641 35,998 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 20,612 23,468 21,707 21,299 19,684 106,770 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 24,260 23,756 21,646 22,419 23,439 115,520 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 31,270 29,516 27,373 26,047 26,908 141,114 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 21,341 24,150 21,524 23,597 21,156 111,768 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 25,603 23,114 22,638 23,422 22,384 117,161 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 36,308 40,218 37,571 37,190 30,469 181,756 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 47,834 50,205 47,629 49,973 47,955 243,596 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 35,703 39,959 37,700 40,249 32,779 186,390 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 37,293 40,724 38,859 41,680 35,373 193,929 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 18,110 20,090 19,228 20,003 15,712 93,143 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 38,085 38,260 35,317 35,048 34,945 181,655 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 48,357 53,560 51,005 47,291 43,195 243,408 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 21,979 27,568 26,806 25,678 22,311 124,342 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 38,174 37,935 35,426 37,266 35,831 184,632 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 27,423 27,537 25,037 25,116 23,625 128,738 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 33,451 36,800 36,110 36,186 29,727 172,274 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 53,689 55,169 52,065 52,738 46,691 260,352 
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60630 1.4 62244 Northside 17,931 18,338 18,089 18,432 17,529 90,319 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 5,061 5,291 5,183 5,352 5,662 26,549 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 43,762 44,156 41,562 39,645 38,058 207,183 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 2,710 3,041 3,050 3,141 2,421 14,363 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 21,214 21,315 21,733 22,298 22,678 109,238 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 23,884 24,721 25,245 26,273 21,041 121,164 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 25,116 29,401 27,975 27,998 22,663 133,153 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 13,153 14,255 12,969 13,429 13,573 67,379 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 48,598 50,876 49,950 50,690 49,536 249,650 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 31,624 30,692 28,681 30,454 29,696 151,147 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 33,737 34,016 33,373 34,180 34,724 170,030 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 12,331 12,407 11,786 11,786 11,398 59,708 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 20,474 21,905 21,234 22,291 18,103 104,007 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 27,287 35,269 34,752 33,048 26,698 157,054 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 20,793 20,789 19,337 20,375 19,553 100,847 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 6,909 7,428 6,764 6,667 6,841 34,609 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 53,854 54,102 52,289 52,196 49,995 262,436 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 27,592 31,351 28,869 31,168 26,976 145,956 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 36,986 45,153 42,482 40,526 37,662 202,809 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 14,665 15,826 14,657 15,450 13,486 74,084 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 17,120 19,208 19,299 19,754 18,375 93,756 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 6,262 6,096 5,613 5,300 5,282 28,553 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 4,763 4,685 4,407 5,095 4,669 23,619 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 6,545 7,057 6,305 6,534 7,023 33,464 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 29,018 27,429 24,684 25,038 25,855 132,024 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 21,423 21,564 20,836 21,943 21,389 107,155 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 19,820 18,869 17,288 18,130 16,784 90,891 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 2,977 3,000 2,784 2,858 2,623 14,242 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 3,299 3,269 3,076 3,299 3,681 16,624 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 10,829 10,841 10,778 11,169 11,031 54,648 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 8,190 9,203 9,773 9,330 7,811 44,307 
x x x Chicago 1,298,474 1,369,086 1,295,933 1,316,825 1,215,796 6,496,114 
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1. Parking Tickets, By 16 Majority-Black Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 20,612 23,468 21,707 21,299 19,684 106,770 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 21,341 24,150 21,524 23,597 21,156 111,768 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 36,308 40,218 37,571 37,190 30,469 181,756 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 35,703 39,959 37,700 40,249 32,779 186,390 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 37,293 40,724 38,859 41,680 35,373 193,929 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 18,110 20,090 19,228 20,003 15,712 93,143 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 21,979 27,568 26,806 25,678 22,311 124,342 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 33,451 36,800 36,110 36,186 29,727 172,274 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 23,884 24,721 25,245 26,273 21,041 121,164 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 25,116 29,401 27,975 27,998 22,663 133,153 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 20,474 21,905 21,234 22,291 18,103 104,007 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 27,287 35,269 34,752 33,048 26,698 157,054 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 27,592 31,351 28,869 31,168 26,976 145,956 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 36,986 45,153 42,482 40,526 37,662 202,809 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 17,120 19,208 19,299 19,754 18,375 93,756 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 8,190 9,203 9,773 9,330 7,811 44,307 
x x x 16 Zip Codes 411,446 469,188 449,134 456,270 386,540 2,172,578 
x x x Chicago 1,298,474 1,369,086 1,295,933 1,316,825 1,215,796 6,496,114 
 
2. Parking Tickets, By 43 Majority-Other Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 3,374 3,421 2,853 2,913 3,055 15,616 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 811 701 638 605 617 3,372 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 571 656 586 550 564 2,927 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 550 539 578 541 614 2,822 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 8,387 7,678 6,868 7,419 7,023 37,375 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 1,573 1,575 1,351 1,311 1,254 7,064 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 11,291 11,403 10,876 10,779 10,161 54,510 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 39,590 40,762 38,409 38,814 37,270 194,845 
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60609 28.9 32284 Southside 32,537 36,072 30,915 34,632 30,369 164,525 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 14,634 14,697 13,308 13,677 13,228 69,544 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 7,737 8,000 7,087 6,533 6,641 35,998 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 24,260 23,756 21,646 22,419 23,439 115,520 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 31,270 29,516 27,373 26,047 26,908 141,114 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 25,603 23,114 22,638 23,422 22,384 117,161 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 47,834 50,205 47,629 49,973 47,955 243,596 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 38,085 38,260 35,317 35,048 34,945 181,655 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 48,357 53,560 51,005 47,291 43,195 243,408 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 38,174 37,935 35,426 37,266 35,831 184,632 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 27,423 27,537 25,037 25,116 23,625 128,738 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 53,689 55,169 52,065 52,738 46,691 260,352 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 17,931 18,338 18,089 18,432 17,529 90,319 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 5,061 5,291 5,183 5,352 5,662 26,549 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 43,762 44,156 41,562 39,645 38,058 207,183 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 2,710 3,041 3,050 3,141 2,421 14,363 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 21,214 21,315 21,733 22,298 22,678 109,238 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 13,153 14,255 12,969 13,429 13,573 67,379 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 48,598 50,876 49,950 50,690 49,536 249,650 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 31,624 30,692 28,681 30,454 29,696 151,147 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 33,737 34,016 33,373 34,180 34,724 170,030 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 12,331 12,407 11,786 11,786 11,398 59,708 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 20,793 20,789 19,337 20,375 19,553 100,847 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 6,909 7,428 6,764 6,667 6,841 34,609 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 53,854 54,102 52,289 52,196 49,995 262,436 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 14,665 15,826 14,657 15,450 13,486 74,084 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 6,262 6,096 5,613 5,300 5,282 28,553 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 4,763 4,685 4,407 5,095 4,669 23,619 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 6,545 7,057 6,305 6,534 7,023 33,464 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 29,018 27,429 24,684 25,038 25,855 132,024 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 21,423 21,564 20,836 21,943 21,389 107,155 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 19,820 18,869 17,288 18,130 16,784 90,891 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 2,977 3,000 2,784 2,858 2,623 14,242 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 3,299 3,269 3,076 3,299 3,681 16,624 
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60707 16.5 54669 Northside 10,829 10,841 10,778 11,169 11,031 54,648 
x x x 43 Zip Codes 887,028 899,898 846,799 860,555 829,256 4,323,536 
x x x Chicago 1,298,474 1,369,086 1,295,933 1,316,825 1,215,796 6,496,114 
  
3. Parking Tickets, By 28 Lower-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 39,590 40,762 38,409 38,814 37,270 194,845 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 32,537 36,072 30,915 34,632 30,369 164,525 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 20,612 23,468 21,707 21,299 19,684 106,770 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 21,341 24,150 21,524 23,597 21,156 111,768 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 25,603 23,114 22,638 23,422 22,384 117,161 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 36,308 40,218 37,571 37,190 30,469 181,756 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 35,703 39,959 37,700 40,249 32,779 186,390 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 37,293 40,724 38,859 41,680 35,373 193,929 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 18,110 20,090 19,228 20,003 15,712 93,143 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 48,357 53,560 51,005 47,291 43,195 243,408 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 21,979 27,568 26,806 25,678 22,311 124,342 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 27,423 27,537 25,037 25,116 23,625 128,738 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 33,451 36,800 36,110 36,186 29,727 172,274 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 53,689 55,169 52,065 52,738 46,691 260,352 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 43,762 44,156 41,562 39,645 38,058 207,183 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 2,710 3,041 3,050 3,141 2,421 14,363 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 23,884 24,721 25,245 26,273 21,041 121,164 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 25,116 29,401 27,975 27,998 22,663 133,153 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 48,598 50,876 49,950 50,690 49,536 249,650 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 31,624 30,692 28,681 30,454 29,696 151,147 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 27,287 35,269 34,752 33,048 26,698 157,054 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 20,793 20,789 19,337 20,375 19,553 100,847 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 27,592 31,351 28,869 31,168 26,976 145,956 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 36,986 45,153 42,482 40,526 37,662 202,809 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 17,120 19,208 19,299 19,754 18,375 93,756 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 21,423 21,564 20,836 21,943 21,389 107,155 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 19,820 18,869 17,288 18,130 16,784 90,891 
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60827 96.8 31063 Southside 8,190 9,203 9,773 9,330 7,811 44,307 
x x x 28 Zip Codes 806,901 873,484 828,673 840,370 749,408 4,098,836 
x x x Chicago 1,298,474 1,369,086 1,295,933 1,316,825 1,215,796 6,496,114 
 
4. Parking Tickets, By 31 Higher-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 3,374 3,421 2,853 2,913 3,055 15,616 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 811 701 638 605 617 3,372 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 571 656 586 550 564 2,927 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 550 539 578 541 614 2,822 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 8,387 7,678 6,868 7,419 7,023 37,375 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 1,573 1,575 1,351 1,311 1,254 7,064 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 11,291 11,403 10,876 10,779 10,161 54,510 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 14,634 14,697 13,308 13,677 13,228 69,544 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 7,737 8,000 7,087 6,533 6,641 35,998 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 24,260 23,756 21,646 22,419 23,439 115,520 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 31,270 29,516 27,373 26,047 26,908 141,114 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 47,834 50,205 47,629 49,973 47,955 243,596 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 38,085 38,260 35,317 35,048 34,945 181,655 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 38,174 37,935 35,426 37,266 35,831 184,632 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 17,931 18,338 18,089 18,432 17,529 90,319 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 5,061 5,291 5,183 5,352 5,662 26,549 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 21,214 21,315 21,733 22,298 22,678 109,238 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 13,153 14,255 12,969 13,429 13,573 67,379 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 33,737 34,016 33,373 34,180 34,724 170,030 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 12,331 12,407 11,786 11,786 11,398 59,708 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 20,474 21,905 21,234 22,291 18,103 104,007 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 6,909 7,428 6,764 6,667 6,841 34,609 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 53,854 54,102 52,289 52,196 49,995 262,436 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 14,665 15,826 14,657 15,450 13,486 74,084 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 6,262 6,096 5,613 5,300 5,282 28,553 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 4,763 4,685 4,407 5,095 4,669 23,619 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 6,545 7,057 6,305 6,534 7,023 33,464 
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60657 2.8 79638 Northside 29,018 27,429 24,684 25,038 25,855 132,024 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 2,977 3,000 2,784 2,858 2,623 14,242 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 3,299 3,269 3,076 3,299 3,681 16,624 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 10,829 10,841 10,778 11,169 11,031 54,648 
x x x 31 Zip Codes 491,573 495,602 467,260 476,455 466,388 2,397,278 
x x x Chicago 1,298,474 1,369,086 1,295,933 1,316,825 1,215,796 6,496,114 
 
5. Parking Tickets, By 25 Southside Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-16 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 8,387 7,678 6,868 7,419 7,023 37,375 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 11,291 11,403 10,876 10,779 10,161 54,510 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 39,590 40,762 38,409 38,814 37,270 194,845 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 32,537 36,072 30,915 34,632 30,369 164,525 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 21,341 24,150 21,524 23,597 21,156 111,768 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 25,603 23,114 22,638 23,422 22,384 117,161 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 36,308 40,218 37,571 37,190 30,469 181,756 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 35,703 39,959 37,700 40,249 32,779 186,390 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 37,293 40,724 38,859 41,680 35,373 193,929 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 18,110 20,090 19,228 20,003 15,712 93,143 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 48,357 53,560 51,005 47,291 43,195 243,408 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 33,451 36,800 36,110 36,186 29,727 172,274 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 53,689 55,169 52,065 52,738 46,691 260,352 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 43,762 44,156 41,562 39,645 38,058 207,183 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 2,710 3,041 3,050 3,141 2,421 14,363 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 23,884 24,721 25,245 26,273 21,041 121,164 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 25,116 29,401 27,975 27,998 22,663 133,153 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 13,153 14,255 12,969 13,429 13,573 67,379 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 12,331 12,407 11,786 11,786 11,398 59,708 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 20,474 21,905 21,234 22,291 18,103 104,007 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 27,592 31,351 28,869 31,168 26,976 145,956 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 14,665 15,826 14,657 15,450 13,486 74,084 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 17,120 19,208 19,299 19,754 18,375 93,756 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 4,763 4,685 4,407 5,095 4,669 23,619 
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60827 96.8 31063 Southside 8,190 9,203 9,773 9,330 7,811 44,307 
x x x 25 Zip Codes 615,420 659,858 624,594 639,360 560,883 3,100,115 
x x x Chicago 1,298,474 1,369,086 1,295,933 1,316,825 1,215,796 6,496,114 
 
6. Parking Tickets, By 34 Northside  Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-16 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 3,374 3,421 2,853 2,913 3,055 15,616 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 811 701 638 605 617 3,372 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 571 656 586 550 564 2,927 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 550 539 578 541 614 2,822 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 1,573 1,575 1,351 1,311 1,254 7,064 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 14,634 14,697 13,308 13,677 13,228 69,544 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 7,737 8,000 7,087 6,533 6,641 35,998 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 20,612 23,468 21,707 21,299 19,684 106,770 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 24,260 23,756 21,646 22,419 23,439 115,520 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 31,270 29,516 27,373 26,047 26,908 141,114 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 47,834 50,205 47,629 49,973 47,955 243,596 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 38,085 38,260 35,317 35,048 34,945 181,655 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 21,979 27,568 26,806 25,678 22,311 124,342 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 38,174 37,935 35,426 37,266 35,831 184,632 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 27,423 27,537 25,037 25,116 23,625 128,738 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 17,931 18,338 18,089 18,432 17,529 90,319 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 5,061 5,291 5,183 5,352 5,662 26,549 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 21,214 21,315 21,733 22,298 22,678 109,238 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 48,598 50,876 49,950 50,690 49,536 249,650 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 31,624 30,692 28,681 30,454 29,696 151,147 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 33,737 34,016 33,373 34,180 34,724 170,030 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 27,287 35,269 34,752 33,048 26,698 157,054 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 20,793 20,789 19,337 20,375 19,553 100,847 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 6,909 7,428 6,764 6,667 6,841 34,609 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 53,854 54,102 52,289 52,196 49,995 262,436 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 36,986 45,153 42,482 40,526 37,662 202,809 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 6,262 6,096 5,613 5,300 5,282 28,553 
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60656 1.8 57308 Northside 6,545 7,057 6,305 6,534 7,023 33,464 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 29,018 27,429 24,684 25,038 25,855 132,024 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 21,423 21,564 20,836 21,943 21,389 107,155 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 19,820 18,869 17,288 18,130 16,784 90,891 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 2,977 3,000 2,784 2,858 2,623 14,242 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 3,299 3,269 3,076 3,299 3,681 16,624 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 10,829 10,841 10,778 11,169 11,031 54,648 
x x x 34 Zip Codes 683,054 709,228 671,339 677,465 654,913 3,395,999 
x x x Chicago 1,298,474 1,369,086 1,295,933 1,316,825 1,215,796 6,496,114 
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B. Parking Ticket Appeals, By All 59 City of Chicago Zip Codes, Fiscal Years 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 431 478 371 493 447 2,220 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 138 89 67 85 61 440 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 106 115 71 90 67 449 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 72 62 52 65 66 317 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 1,561 1,371 1,003 1,442 1,147 6,524 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 200 222 146 173 169 910 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 1,562 1,758 1,305 1,794 1,509 7,928 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 3,515 4,242 3,428 4,020 3,752 18,957 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 2,647 3,742 2,901 3,471 2,738 15,499 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 2,281 2,520 1,836 2,551 2,137 11,325 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 1,168 1,193 955 1,116 1,083 5,515 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 2,351 2,922 2,683 2,781 2,557 13,294 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 3,566 3,699 2,960 3,905 3,809 17,939 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 4,741 4,959 3,840 4,693 4,290 22,523 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 2,851 3,694 3,081 3,814 3,346 16,786 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 5,237 3,880 3,174 4,286 3,518 20,095 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 4,347 5,230 4,740 5,191 4,029 23,537 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 5,688 6,725 5,671 7,090 6,518 31,692 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 4,557 5,690 5,053 6,101 4,605 26,006 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 4,434 5,809 5,046 5,924 4,783 25,996 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 1,698 2,192 2,055 2,170 1,831 9,946 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 4,264 4,544 3,680 4,649 4,243 21,380 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 2,808 3,962 3,303 3,998 3,016 17,087 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 1,780 2,574 2,509 2,823 2,433 12,119 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 5,097 5,154 4,370 5,376 4,927 24,924 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 4,305 4,431 3,413 4,341 4,044 20,534 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 3,749 4,701 4,485 5,075 4,044 22,054 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 3,963 4,993 3,908 5,011 3,965 21,840 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 2,682 2,655 2,434 2,926 2,714 13,411 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 887 915 698 981 871 4,352 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 2,513 2,945 2,305 3,044 2,536 13,343 
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60633 4.8 47136 Southside 416 491 436 481 375 2,199 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 2,658 2,736 2,448 3,100 2,732 13,674 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 2,300 2,632 2,495 3,044 2,267 12,738 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 2,921 3,715 3,571 4,079 3,106 17,392 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 1,832 2,006 1,350 1,962 1,640 8,790 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 3,696 4,766 4,235 4,817 4,288 21,802 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 4,898 4,938 4,092 5,445 5,150 24,523 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 4,078 4,234 3,732 4,355 4,487 20,886 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 1,612 1,750 1,312 1,764 1,420 7,858 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 2,599 3,190 2,700 3,150 2,462 14,101 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 2,413 4,149 4,011 4,261 3,118 17,952 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 3,728 3,772 3,237 3,757 3,629 18,123 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 1,157 1,233 929 1,074 1,148 5,541 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 5,672 6,115 5,205 6,234 5,469 28,695 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 3,304 4,166 3,726 4,489 3,512 19,197 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 3,061 4,912 4,189 4,718 4,011 20,891 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 1,671 2,021 1,612 1,954 1,669 8,927 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 2,012 2,535 2,400 2,826 2,470 12,243 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 944 911 711 860 740 4,166 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 673 791 627 809 657 3,557 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 1,349 1,521 1,225 1,358 1,414 6,867 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 4,260 4,346 3,259 4,437 3,949 20,251 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 4,309 4,047 3,635 4,300 4,543 20,834 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 3,587 3,369 2,717 3,276 3,080 16,029 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 463 492 344 463 357 2,119 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 509 483 416 494 662 2,564 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 1,316 1,527 1,203 1,625 1,514 7,185 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 933 1,098 1,129 1,169 911 5,240 
x x x Chicago 153,570 175,412 148,489 179,780 156,035 813,286 
 
1. Parking Ticket Appeals, By 16 Majority-Black Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 2,351 2,922 2,683 2,781 2,557 13,294 
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60615 62.0 41108 Southside 2,851 3,694 3,081 3,814 3,346 16,786 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 4,347 5,230 4,740 5,191 4,029 23,537 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 4,557 5,690 5,053 6,101 4,605 26,006 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 4,434 5,809 5,046 5,924 4,783 25,996 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 1,698 2,192 2,055 2,170 1,831 9,946 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 1,780 2,574 2,509 2,823 2,433 12,119 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 3,749 4,701 4,485 5,075 4,044 22,054 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 2,300 2,632 2,495 3,044 2,267 12,738 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 2,921 3,715 3,571 4,079 3,106 17,392 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 2,599 3,190 2,700 3,150 2,462 14,101 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 2,413 4,149 4,011 4,261 3,118 17,952 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 3,304 4,166 3,726 4,489 3,512 19,197 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 3,061 4,912 4,189 4,718 4,011 20,891 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 2,012 2,535 2,400 2,826 2,470 12,243 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 933 1,098 1,129 1,169 911 5,240 
x x x 16 Zip Codes 45,310 59,209 53,873 61,615 49,485 269,492 
x x x Chicago 153,570 175,412 148,489 179,780 156,035 813,286 
2. Parking Ticket Appeals, By 43 Majority-Other Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 431 478 371 493 447 2,220 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 138 89 67 85 61 440 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 106 115 71 90 67 449 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 72 62 52 65 66 317 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 1,561 1,371 1,003 1,442 1,147 6,524 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 200 222 146 173 169 910 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 1,562 1,758 1,305 1,794 1,509 7,928 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 3,515 4,242 3,428 4,020 3,752 18,957 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 2,647 3,742 2,901 3,471 2,738 15,499 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 2,281 2,520 1,836 2,551 2,137 11,325 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 1,168 1,193 955 1,116 1,083 5,515 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 3,566 3,699 2,960 3,905 3,809 17,939 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 4,741 4,959 3,840 4,693 4,290 22,523 
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60616 26.0 42594 Southside 5,237 3,880 3,174 4,286 3,518 20,095 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 5,688 6,725 5,671 7,090 6,518 31,692 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 4,264 4,544 3,680 4,649 4,243 21,380 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 2,808 3,962 3,303 3,998 3,016 17,087 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 5,097 5,154 4,370 5,376 4,927 24,924 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 4,305 4,431 3,413 4,341 4,044 20,534 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 3,963 4,993 3,908 5,011 3,965 21,840 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 2,682 2,655 2,434 2,926 2,714 13,411 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 887 915 698 981 871 4,352 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 2,513 2,945 2,305 3,044 2,536 13,343 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 416 491 436 481 375 2,199 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 2,658 2,736 2,448 3,100 2,732 13,674 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 1,832 2,006 1,350 1,962 1,640 8,790 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 3,696 4,766 4,235 4,817 4,288 21,802 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 4,898 4,938 4,092 5,445 5,150 24,523 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 4,078 4,234 3,732 4,355 4,487 20,886 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 1,612 1,750 1,312 1,764 1,420 7,858 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 3,728 3,772 3,237 3,757 3,629 18,123 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 1,157 1,233 929 1,074 1,148 5,541 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 5,672 6,115 5,205 6,234 5,469 28,695 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 1,671 2,021 1,612 1,954 1,669 8,927 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 944 911 711 860 740 4,166 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 673 791 627 809 657 3,557 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 1,349 1,521 1,225 1,358 1,414 6,867 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 4,260 4,346 3,259 4,437 3,949 20,251 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 4,309 4,047 3,635 4,300 4,543 20,834 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 3,587 3,369 2,717 3,276 3,080 16,029 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 463 492 344 463 357 2,119 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 509 483 416 494 662 2,564 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 1,316 1,527 1,203 1,625 1,514 7,185 
x x x 43 Zip Codes 108,260 116,203 94,616 118,165 106,550 543,794 
x x x Chicago 153,570 175,412 148,489 179,780 156,035 813,286 
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3. Parking Ticket Appeals, By 28 Lower-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 3,515 4,242 3,428 4,020 3,752 18,957 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 2,647 3,742 2,901 3,471 2,738 15,499 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 2,351 2,922 2,683 2,781 2,557 13,294 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 2,851 3,694 3,081 3,814 3,346 16,786 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 5,237 3,880 3,174 4,286 3,518 20,095 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 4,347 5,230 4,740 5,191 4,029 23,537 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 4,557 5,690 5,053 6,101 4,605 26,006 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 4,434 5,809 5,046 5,924 4,783 25,996 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 1,698 2,192 2,055 2,170 1,831 9,946 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 2,808 3,962 3,303 3,998 3,016 17,087 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 1,780 2,574 2,509 2,823 2,433 12,119 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 4,305 4,431 3,413 4,341 4,044 20,534 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 3,749 4,701 4,485 5,075 4,044 22,054 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 3,963 4,993 3,908 5,011 3,965 21,840 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 2,513 2,945 2,305 3,044 2,536 13,343 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 416 491 436 481 375 2,199 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 2,300 2,632 2,495 3,044 2,267 12,738 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 2,921 3,715 3,571 4,079 3,106 17,392 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 3,696 4,766 4,235 4,817 4,288 21,802 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 4,898 4,938 4,092 5,445 5,150 24,523 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 2,413 4,149 4,011 4,261 3,118 17,952 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 3,728 3,772 3,237 3,757 3,629 18,123 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 3,304 4,166 3,726 4,489 3,512 19,197 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 3,061 4,912 4,189 4,718 4,011 20,891 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 2,012 2,535 2,400 2,826 2,470 12,243 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 4,309 4,047 3,635 4,300 4,543 20,834 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 3,587 3,369 2,717 3,276 3,080 16,029 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 933 1,098 1,129 1,169 911 5,240 
x x x 28 Zip Codes 88,333 105,597 91,957 108,712 91,657 486,256 
x x x Chicago 153,570 175,412 148,489 179,780 156,035 813,286 
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4. Parking Ticket Appeals, By 31 Higher-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 431 478 371 493 447 2,220 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 138 89 67 85 61 440 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 106 115 71 90 67 449 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 72 62 52 65 66 317 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 1,561 1,371 1,003 1,442 1,147 6,524 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 200 222 146 173 169 910 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 1,562 1,758 1,305 1,794 1,509 7,928 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 2,281 2,520 1,836 2,551 2,137 11,325 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 1,168 1,193 955 1,116 1,083 5,515 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 3,566 3,699 2,960 3,905 3,809 17,939 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 4,741 4,959 3,840 4,693 4,290 22,523 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 5,688 6,725 5,671 7,090 6,518 31,692 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 4,264 4,544 3,680 4,649 4,243 21,380 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 5,097 5,154 4,370 5,376 4,927 24,924 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 2,682 2,655 2,434 2,926 2,714 13,411 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 887 915 698 981 871 4,352 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 2,658 2,736 2,448 3,100 2,732 13,674 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 1,832 2,006 1,350 1,962 1,640 8,790 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 4,078 4,234 3,732 4,355 4,487 20,886 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 1,612 1,750 1,312 1,764 1,420 7,858 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 2,599 3,190 2,700 3,150 2,462 14,101 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 1,157 1,233 929 1,074 1,148 5,541 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 5,672 6,115 5,205 6,234 5,469 28,695 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 1,671 2,021 1,612 1,954 1,669 8,927 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 944 911 711 860 740 4,166 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 673 791 627 809 657 3,557 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 1,349 1,521 1,225 1,358 1,414 6,867 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 4,260 4,346 3,259 4,437 3,949 20,251 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 463 492 344 463 357 2,119 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 509 483 416 494 662 2,564 
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60707 16.5 54669 Northside 1,316 1,527 1,203 1,625 1,514 7,185 
x x x 31 Zip Codes 65,237 69,815 56,532 71068.0 64,378 327,030 
x x x Chicago 153,570 175,412 148,489 179,780 156,035 813,286 
 
5. Parking Ticket Appeals, By 25 Southside Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-16 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 1,561 1,371 1,003 1,442 1,147 6,524 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 1,562 1,758 1,305 1,794 1,509 7,928 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 3,515 4,242 3,428 4,020 3,752 18,957 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 2,647 3,742 2,901 3,471 2,738 15,499 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 2,851 3,694 3,081 3,814 3,346 16,786 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 5,237 3,880 3,174 4,286 3,518 20,095 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 4,347 5,230 4,740 5,191 4,029 23,537 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 4,557 5,690 5,053 6,101 4,605 26,006 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 4,434 5,809 5,046 5,924 4,783 25,996 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 1,698 2,192 2,055 2,170 1,831 9,946 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 2,808 3,962 3,303 3,998 3,016 17,087 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 3,749 4,701 4,485 5,075 4,044 22,054 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 3,963 4,993 3,908 5,011 3,965 21,840 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 2,513 2,945 2,305 3,044 2,536 13,343 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 416 491 436 481 375 2,199 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 2,300 2,632 2,495 3,044 2,267 12,738 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 2,921 3,715 3,571 4,079 3,106 17,392 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 1,832 2,006 1,350 1,962 1,640 8,790 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 1,612 1,750 1,312 1,764 1,420 7,858 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 2,599 3,190 2,700 3,150 2,462 14,101 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 3,304 4,166 3,726 4,489 3,512 19,197 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 1,671 2,021 1,612 1,954 1,669 8,927 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 2,012 2,535 2,400 2,826 2,470 12,243 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 673 791 627 809 657 3,557 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 933 1,098 1,129 1,169 911 5,240 
x x x 25 Zip Codes 65,715 78,604 67,145 81068 65,308 357,840 
x x x Chicago 153,570 175,412 148,489 179,780 156,035 813,286 
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6. Parking Ticket Appeals, By 34 Northside  Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-16 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 431 478 371 493 447 2,220 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 138 89 67 85 61 440 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 106 115 71 90 67 449 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 72 62 52 65 66 317 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 200 222 146 173 169 910 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 2,281 2,520 1,836 2,551 2,137 11,325 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 1,168 1,193 955 1,116 1,083 5,515 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 2,351 2,922 2,683 2,781 2,557 13,294 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 3,566 3,699 2,960 3,905 3,809 17,939 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 4,741 4,959 3,840 4,693 4,290 22,523 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 5,688 6,725 5,671 7,090 6,518 31,692 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 4,264 4,544 3,680 4,649 4,243 21,380 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 1,780 2,574 2,509 2,823 2,433 12,119 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 5,097 5,154 4,370 5,376 4,927 24,924 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 4,305 4,431 3,413 4,341 4,044 20,534 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 2,682 2,655 2,434 2,926 2,714 13,411 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 887 915 698 981 871 4,352 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 2,658 2,736 2,448 3,100 2,732 13,674 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 3,696 4,766 4,235 4,817 4,288 21,802 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 4,898 4,938 4,092 5,445 5,150 24,523 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 4,078 4,234 3,732 4,355 4,487 20,886 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 2,413 4,149 4,011 4,261 3,118 17,952 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 3,728 3,772 3,237 3,757 3,629 18,123 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 1,157 1,233 929 1,074 1,148 5,541 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 5,672 6,115 5,205 6,234 5,469 28,695 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 3,061 4,912 4,189 4,718 4,011 20,891 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 944 911 711 860 740 4,166 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 1,349 1,521 1,225 1,358 1,414 6,867 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 4,260 4,346 3,259 4,437 3,949 20,251 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 4,309 4,047 3,635 4,300 4,543 20,834 
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60660 15.7 41412 Northside 3,587 3,369 2,717 3,276 3,080 16,029 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 463 492 344 463 357 2,119 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 509 483 416 494 662 2,564 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 1,316 1,527 1,203 1,625 1,514 7,185 
x x x 34 Zip Codes 87,855 96,808 81,344 98,712 90,727 455,446 
x x x Chicago 153,570 175,412 148,489 179,780 156,035 813,286 
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C. Successful Parking Ticket Appeals, By All 59 City of Chicago Zip Codes, 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-16 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 250 274 221 300 275 1,320 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 94 52 45 48 39 278 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 77 84 51 53 42 307 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 28 38 32 42 35 175 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 853 742 595 918 669 3,777 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 117 133 93 89 92 524 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 824 948 772 1,118 874 4,536 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 2,070 2,519 2,105 2,546 2,290 11,530 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 1,645 2,407 1,929 2,298 1,721 10,000 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 1,287 1,498 1,161 1,613 1,289 6,848 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 620 614 589 688 647 3,158 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 1,370 1,849 1,772 1,768 1,533 8,292 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 1,967 2,034 1,739 2,435 2,349 10,524 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 2,513 2,683 2,334 2,924 2,499 12,953 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 1,632 2,157 1,912 2,369 1,985 10,055 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 3,490 2,369 1,979 2,772 2,200 12,810 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 2,648 3,261 3,046 3,469 2,435 14,859 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 3,268 4,274 3,689 4,618 4,299 20,148 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 2,718 3,607 3,262 4,036 2,831 16,454 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 2,759 3,630 3,280 3,932 2,941 16,542 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 1,036 1,431 1,376 1,424 1,128 6,395 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 2,371 2,478 2,165 2,937 2,573 12,524 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 1,751 2,562 2,202 2,682 1,918 11,115 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 1,046 1,726 1,711 1,882 1,508 7,873 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 3,158 3,062 2,798 3,539 3,112 15,669 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 2,784 2,888 2,272 2,878 2,734 13,556 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 2,247 2,958 2,974 3,396 2,527 14,102 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 2,339 3,217 2,468 3,223 2,451 13,698 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 1,646 1,633 1,559 1,909 1,790 8,537 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 518 548 420 637 516 2,639 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 1,486 1,802 1,479 1,998 1,694 8,459 
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60633 4.8 47136 Southside 247 321 292 338 246 1,444 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 1,556 1,608 1,518 1,959 1,683 8,324 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 1,447 1,732 1,675 2,074 1,417 8,345 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 1,719 2,359 2,368 2,694 1,921 11,061 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 1,102 1,242 804 1,219 1,019 5,386 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 2,283 3,129 2,791 3,135 2,670 14,008 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 2,937 2,964 2,621 3,699 3,347 15,568 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 2,515 2,693 2,428 2,831 2,914 13,381 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 844 976 770 1,092 835 4,517 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 1,583 1,940 1,713 1,979 1,467 8,682 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 1,476 2,772 2,801 2,921 1,910 11,880 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 2,386 2,379 2,171 2,501 2,421 11,858 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 697 733 592 688 714 3,424 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 3,190 3,641 3,128 3,992 3,378 17,329 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 1,999 2,558 2,328 2,887 2,109 11,881 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 1,796 3,195 2,837 3,110 2,584 13,522 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 949 1,203 997 1,237 990 5,376 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 1,181 1,555 1,511 1,771 1,509 7,527 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 504 489 411 514 434 2,352 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 375 444 401 497 382 2,099 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 957 1,044 899 959 1,046 4,905 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 2,260 2,326 1,893 2,762 2,370 11,611 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 2,910 2,661 2,536 3,012 3,291 14,410 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 2,327 2,081 1,818 2,258 2,072 10,556 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 237 268 212 278 212 1,207 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 349 292 291 344 505 1,781 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 842 983 790 1,087 1,016 4,718 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 606 703 780 767 569 3,425 
x x x Chicago 91,886 107,769 95,406 117,146 98,027 510,234 
 
1. Successful Ticket Appeals, By 16 Majority-Black Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 1,370 1,849 1,772 1,768 1,533 8,292 
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60615 62.0 41108 Southside 1,632 2,157 1,912 2,369 1,985 10,055 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 2,648 3,261 3,046 3,469 2,435 14,859 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 2,718 3,607 3,262 4,036 2,831 16,454 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 2,759 3,630 3,280 3,932 2,941 16,542 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 1,036 1,431 1,376 1,424 1,128 6,395 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 1,046 1,726 1,711 1,882 1,508 7,873 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 2,247 2,958 2,974 3,396 2,527 14,102 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 1,447 1,732 1,675 2,074 1,417 8,345 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 1,719 2,359 2,368 2,694 1,921 11,061 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 1,583 1,940 1,713 1,979 1,467 8,682 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 1,476 2,772 2,801 2,921 1,910 11,880 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 1,999 2,558 2,328 2,887 2,109 11,881 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 1,796 3,195 2,837 3,110 2,584 13,522 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 1,181 1,555 1,511 1,771 1,509 7,527 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 606 703 780 767 569 3,425 
x x x 16 Zip Codes 27,263 37,433 35,346 40,479 30,374 170,895 
x x x Chicago 91,886 107,769 95,406 117,146 98,027 510,234 
 
2. Successful Ticket Appeals, By 43 Majority-Other Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 250 274 221 300 275 1,320 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 94 52 45 48 39 278 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 77 84 51 53 42 307 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 28 38 32 42 35 175 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 853 742 595 918 669 3,777 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 117 133 93 89 92 524 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 824 948 772 1,118 874 4,536 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 2,070 2,519 2,105 2,546 2,290 11,530 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 1,645 2,407 1,929 2,298 1,721 10,000 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 1,287 1,498 1,161 1,613 1,289 6,848 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 620 614 589 688 647 3,158 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 1,967 2,034 1,739 2,435 2,349 10,524 
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60614 3.9 92714 Northside 2,513 2,683 2,334 2,924 2,499 12,953 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 3,490 2,369 1,979 2,772 2,200 12,810 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 3,268 4,274 3,689 4,618 4,299 20,148 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 2,371 2,478 2,165 2,937 2,573 12,524 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 1,751 2,562 2,202 2,682 1,918 11,115 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 3,158 3,062 2,798 3,539 3,112 15,669 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 2,784 2,888 2,272 2,878 2,734 13,556 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 2,339 3,217 2,468 3,223 2,451 13,698 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 1,646 1,633 1,559 1,909 1,790 8,537 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 518 548 420 637 516 2,639 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 1,486 1,802 1,479 1,998 1,694 8,459 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 247 321 292 338 246 1,444 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 1,556 1,608 1,518 1,959 1,683 8,324 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 1,102 1,242 804 1,219 1,019 5,386 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 2,283 3,129 2,791 3,135 2,670 14,008 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 2,937 2,964 2,621 3,699 3,347 15,568 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 2,515 2,693 2,428 2,831 2,914 13,381 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 844 976 770 1,092 835 4,517 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 2,386 2,379 2,171 2,501 2,421 11,858 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 697 733 592 688 714 3,424 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 3,190 3,641 3,128 3,992 3,378 17,329 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 949 1,203 997 1,237 990 5,376 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 504 489 411 514 434 2,352 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 375 444 401 497 382 2,099 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 957 1,044 899 959 1,046 4,905 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 2,260 2,326 1,893 2,762 2,370 11,611 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 2,910 2,661 2,536 3,012 3,291 14,410 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 2,327 2,081 1,818 2,258 2,072 10,556 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 237 268 212 278 212 1,207 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 349 292 291 344 505 1,781 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 842 983 790 1,087 1,016 4,718 
x x x 43 Zip Codes 64,623 70,336 60,060 76,667 67,653 339,339 
x x x Chicago 91,886 107,769 95,406 117,146 98,027 510,234 
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3. Successful Ticket Appeals, By 28 Lower-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 1,036 1,431 1,376 1,424 1,128 6,395 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 1,046 1,726 1,711 1,882 1,508 7,873 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 1,181 1,555 1,511 1,771 1,509 7,527 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 1,999 2,558 2,328 2,887 2,109 11,881 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 1,719 2,359 2,368 2,694 1,921 11,061 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 1,476 2,772 2,801 2,921 1,910 11,880 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 1,447 1,732 1,675 2,074 1,417 8,345 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 1,751 2,562 2,202 2,682 1,918 11,115 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 606 703 780 767 569 3,425 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 1,796 3,195 2,837 3,110 2,584 13,522 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 2,759 3,630 3,280 3,932 2,941 16,542 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 2,718 3,607 3,262 4,036 2,831 16,454 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 1,645 2,407 1,929 2,298 1,721 10,000 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 1,370 1,849 1,772 1,768 1,533 8,292 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 2,070 2,519 2,105 2,546 2,290 11,530 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 2,247 2,958 2,974 3,396 2,527 14,102 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 2,784 2,888 2,272 2,878 2,734 13,556 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 2,648 3,261 3,046 3,469 2,435 14,859 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 1,486 1,802 1,479 1,998 1,694 8,459 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 2,283 3,129 2,791 3,135 2,670 14,008 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 2,339 3,217 2,468 3,223 2,451 13,698 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 1,632 2,157 1,912 2,369 1,985 10,055 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 2,327 2,081 1,818 2,258 2,072 10,556 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 3,490 2,369 1,979 2,772 2,200 12,810 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 247 321 292 338 246 1,444 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 2,937 2,964 2,621 3,699 3,347 15,568 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 2,386 2,379 2,171 2,501 2,421 11,858 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 2,910 2,661 2,536 3,012 3,291 14,410 
x x x 28 Zip Codes 54,335 66,792 60,296 71,840 57,962 311,225 
x x x Chicago 91,886 107,769 95,406 117,146 98,027 510,234 
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4. Successful Ticket Appeals, By 31 Higher-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 250 274 221 300 275 1,320 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 94 52 45 48 39 278 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 77 84 51 53 42 307 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 28 38 32 42 35 175 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 853 742 595 918 669 3,777 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 117 133 93 89 92 524 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 824 948 772 1,118 874 4,536 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 1,287 1,498 1,161 1,613 1,289 6,848 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 620 614 589 688 647 3,158 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 1,967 2,034 1,739 2,435 2,349 10,524 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 2,513 2,683 2,334 2,924 2,499 12,953 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 3,268 4,274 3,689 4,618 4,299 20,148 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 2,371 2,478 2,165 2,937 2,573 12,524 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 3,158 3,062 2,798 3,539 3,112 15,669 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 1,646 1,633 1,559 1,909 1,790 8,537 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 518 548 420 637 516 2,639 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 1,556 1,608 1,518 1,959 1,683 8,324 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 1,102 1,242 804 1,219 1,019 5,386 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 2,515 2,693 2,428 2,831 2,914 13,381 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 844 976 770 1,092 835 4,517 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 1,583 1,940 1,713 1,979 1,467 8,682 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 697 733 592 688 714 3,424 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 3,190 3,641 3,128 3,992 3,378 17,329 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 949 1,203 997 1,237 990 5,376 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 504 489 411 514 434 2,352 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 375 444 401 497 382 2,099 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 957 1,044 899 959 1,046 4,905 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 2,260 2,326 1,893 2,762 2,370 11,611 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 237 268 212 278 212 1,207 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 349 292 291 344 505 1,781 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 842 983 790 1,087 1,016 4,718 
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x x x 31 Zip Codes 37,551 40,977 35,110 45,306 40,065 199,009 
x x x Chicago 91,886 107,769 95,406 117,146 98,027 510,234 
 
 
5. Successful Ticket Appeals, By 25 Southside Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 853 742 595 918 669 3,777 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 824 948 772 1,118 874 4,536 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 2,070 2,519 2,105 2,546 2,290 11,530 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 1,645 2,407 1,929 2,298 1,721 10,000 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 1,632 2,157 1,912 2,369 1,985 10,055 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 3,490 2,369 1,979 2,772 2,200 12,810 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 2,648 3,261 3,046 3,469 2,435 14,859 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 2,718 3,607 3,262 4,036 2,831 16,454 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 2,759 3,630 3,280 3,932 2,941 16,542 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 1,036 1,431 1,376 1,424 1,128 6,395 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 1,751 2,562 2,202 2,682 1,918 11,115 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 2,247 2,958 2,974 3,396 2,527 14,102 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 2,339 3,217 2,468 3,223 2,451 13,698 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 1,486 1,802 1,479 1,998 1,694 8,459 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 247 321 292 338 246 1,444 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 1,447 1,732 1,675 2,074 1,417 8,345 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 1,719 2,359 2,368 2,694 1,921 11,061 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 1,102 1,242 804 1,219 1,019 5,386 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 844 976 770 1,092 835 4,517 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 1,583 1,940 1,713 1,979 1,467 8,682 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 1,999 2,558 2,328 2,887 2,109 11,881 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 949 1,203 997 1,237 990 5,376 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 1,181 1,555 1,511 1,771 1,509 7,527 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 375 444 401 497 382 2,099 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 606 703 780 767 569 3,425 
x x x 25 Zip Codes 39,550 48,643 43,018 52,736 40,128 224,075 
x x x Chicago 91,886 107,769 95,406 117,146 98,027 510,234 
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6. Successful Ticket Appeals, By 34 Northside Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 250 274 221 300 275 1,320 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 94 52 45 48 39 278 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 77 84 51 53 42 307 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 28 38 32 42 35 175 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 117 133 93 89 92 524 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 1,287 1,498 1,161 1,613 1,289 6,848 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 620 614 589 688 647 3,158 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 1,370 1,849 1,772 1,768 1,533 8,292 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 1,967 2,034 1,739 2,435 2,349 10,524 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 2,513 2,683 2,334 2,924 2,499 12,953 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 3,268 4,274 3,689 4,618 4,299 20,148 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 2,371 2,478 2,165 2,937 2,573 12,524 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 1,046 1,726 1,711 1,882 1,508 7,873 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 3,158 3,062 2,798 3,539 3,112 15,669 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 2,784 2,888 2,272 2,878 2,734 13,556 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 1,646 1,633 1,559 1,909 1,790 8,537 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 518 548 420 637 516 2,639 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 1,556 1,608 1,518 1,959 1,683 8,324 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 2,283 3,129 2,791 3,135 2,670 14,008 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 2,937 2,964 2,621 3,699 3,347 15,568 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 2,515 2,693 2,428 2,831 2,914 13,381 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 1,476 2,772 2,801 2,921 1,910 11,880 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 2,386 2,379 2,171 2,501 2,421 11,858 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 697 733 592 688 714 3,424 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 3,190 3,641 3,128 3,992 3,378 17,329 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 1,796 3,195 2,837 3,110 2,584 13,522 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 504 489 411 514 434 2,352 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 957 1,044 899 959 1,046 4,905 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 2,260 2,326 1,893 2,762 2,370 11,611 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 2,910 2,661 2,536 3,012 3,291 14,410 
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60660 15.7 41412 Northside 2,327 2,081 1,818 2,258 2,072 10,556 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 237 268 212 278 212 1,207 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 349 292 291 344 505 1,781 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 842 983 790 1,087 1,016 4,718 
x x x 34 Zip Codes 52,336 59,126 52,388 64,410 57,899 286,159 
x x x Chicago 91,886 107,769 95,406 117,146 98,027 510,234 
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D. Appeals Rate (x100), By All 59 City of Chicago Zip Codes, 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-16 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.1277 0.1397 0.1300 0.1692 0.1463 0.1422 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.1702 0.1270 0.1050 0.1405 0.0989 0.1305 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.1856 0.1753 0.1212 0.1636 0.1188 0.1534 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.1309 0.1150 0.0900 0.1201 0.1075 0.1123 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.1861 0.1786 0.1460 0.1944 0.1633 0.1746 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.1271 0.1410 0.1081 0.1320 0.1348 0.1288 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.1383 0.1542 0.1200 0.1664 0.1485 0.1454 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.0888 0.1041 0.0892 0.1036 0.1007 0.0973 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.0814 0.1037 0.0938 0.1002 0.0902 0.0942 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.1559 0.1715 0.1380 0.1865 0.1616 0.1628 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.1510 0.1491 0.1348 0.1708 0.1631 0.1532 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.1141 0.1245 0.1236 0.1306 0.1299 0.1245 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.1470 0.1557 0.1367 0.1742 0.1625 0.1553 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.1516 0.1680 0.1403 0.1802 0.1594 0.1596 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.1336 0.1530 0.1431 0.1616 0.1582 0.1502 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.2045 0.1679 0.1402 0.1830 0.1572 0.1715 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.1197 0.1300 0.1262 0.1396 0.1322 0.1295 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.1189 0.1340 0.1191 0.1419 0.1359 0.1301 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.1276 0.1424 0.1340 0.1516 0.1405 0.1395 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.1189 0.1426 0.1299 0.1421 0.1352 0.1340 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.0938 0.1091 0.1069 0.1085 0.1165 0.1068 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.1120 0.1188 0.1042 0.1326 0.1214 0.1177 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.0581 0.0740 0.0648 0.0845 0.0698 0.0702 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.0810 0.0934 0.0936 0.1099 0.1090 0.0975 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.1335 0.1359 0.1234 0.1443 0.1375 0.1350 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.1570 0.1609 0.1363 0.1728 0.1712 0.1595 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.1121 0.1277 0.1242 0.1402 0.1360 0.1280 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.0738 0.0905 0.0751 0.0950 0.0849 0.0839 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.1496 0.1448 0.1346 0.1587 0.1548 0.1485 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.1753 0.1729 0.1347 0.1833 0.1538 0.1639 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.0574 0.0667 0.0555 0.0768 0.0666 0.0644 
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60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.1535 0.1615 0.1430 0.1531 0.1549 0.1531 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.1253 0.1284 0.1126 0.1390 0.1205 0.1252 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.0963 0.1065 0.0988 0.1159 0.1077 0.1051 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.1163 0.1264 0.1276 0.1457 0.1371 0.1306 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.1393 0.1407 0.1041 0.1461 0.1208 0.1305 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.0761 0.0937 0.0848 0.0950 0.0866 0.0873 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.1549 0.1609 0.1427 0.1788 0.1734 0.1622 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.1209 0.1245 0.1118 0.1274 0.1292 0.1228 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.1307 0.1410 0.1113 0.1497 0.1246 0.1316 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.1269 0.1456 0.1272 0.1413 0.1360 0.1356 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.0884 0.1176 0.1154 0.1289 0.1168 0.1143 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.1793 0.1814 0.1674 0.1844 0.1856 0.1797 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.1675 0.1660 0.1373 0.1611 0.1678 0.1601 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.1053 0.1130 0.0995 0.1194 0.1094 0.1093 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.1197 0.1329 0.1291 0.1440 0.1302 0.1315 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.0828 0.1088 0.0986 0.1164 0.1065 0.1030 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.1139 0.1277 0.1100 0.1265 0.1238 0.1205 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.1175 0.1320 0.1244 0.1431 0.1344 0.1306 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.1508 0.1494 0.1267 0.1623 0.1401 0.1459 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.1413 0.1688 0.1423 0.1588 0.1407 0.1506 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.2061 0.2155 0.1943 0.2078 0.2013 0.2052 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.1468 0.1584 0.1320 0.1772 0.1527 0.1534 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.2011 0.1877 0.1745 0.1960 0.2124 0.1944 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.1810 0.1785 0.1572 0.1807 0.1835 0.1764 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.1555 0.1640 0.1236 0.1620 0.1361 0.1488 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.1543 0.1478 0.1352 0.1497 0.1798 0.1542 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.1215 0.1409 0.1116 0.1455 0.1372 0.1315 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.1139 0.1193 0.1155 0.1253 0.1166 0.1183 
x x x Chicago 0.1317 0.1392 0.1217 0.1464 0.1361 0.1352 
 
1. Appeals Rate (x100), By 16 Majority-Black Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.1141 0.1245 0.1236 0.1306 0.1299 0.1245 
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60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.1336 0.1530 0.1431 0.1616 0.1582 0.1502 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.1197 0.1300 0.1262 0.1396 0.1322 0.1295 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.1276 0.1424 0.1340 0.1516 0.1405 0.1395 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.1189 0.1426 0.1299 0.1421 0.1352 0.1340 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.0938 0.1091 0.1069 0.1085 0.1165 0.1068 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.0810 0.0934 0.0936 0.1099 0.1090 0.0975 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.1121 0.1277 0.1242 0.1402 0.1360 0.1280 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.0963 0.1065 0.0988 0.1159 0.1077 0.1051 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.1163 0.1264 0.1276 0.1457 0.1371 0.1306 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.1269 0.1456 0.1272 0.1413 0.1360 0.1356 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.0884 0.1176 0.1154 0.1289 0.1168 0.1143 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.1197 0.1329 0.1291 0.1440 0.1302 0.1315 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.0828 0.1088 0.0986 0.1164 0.1065 0.1030 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.1175 0.1320 0.1244 0.1431 0.1344 0.1306 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.1139 0.1193 0.1155 0.1253 0.1166 0.1183 
x x x 16 Zip Codes 0.1102 0.1257 0.1199 0.1340 0.1277 0.1237 
x x x Chicago 0.1317 0.1392 0.1217 0.1464 0.1361 0.1352 
x x x Difference -0.0215 -0.0135 -0.0018 -0.0124 -0.0084 -0.0115 
 
2. Appeals Rate (x100), By 43 Majority-Other Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.1277 0.1397 0.1300 0.1692 0.1463 0.1422 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.1702 0.1270 0.1050 0.1405 0.0989 0.1305 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.1856 0.1753 0.1212 0.1636 0.1188 0.1534 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.1309 0.1150 0.0900 0.1201 0.1075 0.1123 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.1861 0.1786 0.1460 0.1944 0.1633 0.1746 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.1271 0.1410 0.1081 0.1320 0.1348 0.1288 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.1383 0.1542 0.1200 0.1664 0.1485 0.1454 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.0888 0.1041 0.0892 0.1036 0.1007 0.0973 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.0814 0.1037 0.0938 0.1002 0.0902 0.0942 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.1559 0.1715 0.1380 0.1865 0.1616 0.1628 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.1510 0.1491 0.1348 0.1708 0.1631 0.1532 
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60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.1470 0.1557 0.1367 0.1742 0.1625 0.1553 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.1516 0.1680 0.1403 0.1802 0.1594 0.1596 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.2045 0.1679 0.1402 0.1830 0.1572 0.1715 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.1189 0.1340 0.1191 0.1419 0.1359 0.1301 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.1120 0.1188 0.1042 0.1326 0.1214 0.1177 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.0581 0.0740 0.0648 0.0845 0.0698 0.0702 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.1335 0.1359 0.1234 0.1443 0.1375 0.1350 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.1570 0.1609 0.1363 0.1728 0.1712 0.1595 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.0738 0.0905 0.0751 0.0950 0.0849 0.0839 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.1496 0.1448 0.1346 0.1587 0.1548 0.1485 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.1753 0.1729 0.1347 0.1833 0.1538 0.1639 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.0574 0.0667 0.0555 0.0768 0.0666 0.0644 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.1535 0.1615 0.1430 0.1531 0.1549 0.1531 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.1253 0.1284 0.1126 0.1390 0.1205 0.1252 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.1393 0.1407 0.1041 0.1461 0.1208 0.1305 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.0761 0.0937 0.0848 0.0950 0.0866 0.0873 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.1549 0.1609 0.1427 0.1788 0.1734 0.1622 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.1209 0.1245 0.1118 0.1274 0.1292 0.1228 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.1307 0.1410 0.1113 0.1497 0.1246 0.1316 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.1793 0.1814 0.1674 0.1844 0.1856 0.1797 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.1675 0.1660 0.1373 0.1611 0.1678 0.1601 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.1053 0.1130 0.0995 0.1194 0.1094 0.1093 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.1139 0.1277 0.1100 0.1265 0.1238 0.1205 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.1508 0.1494 0.1267 0.1623 0.1401 0.1459 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.1413 0.1688 0.1423 0.1588 0.1407 0.1506 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.2061 0.2155 0.1943 0.2078 0.2013 0.2052 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.1468 0.1584 0.1320 0.1772 0.1527 0.1534 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.2011 0.1877 0.1745 0.1960 0.2124 0.1944 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.1810 0.1785 0.1572 0.1807 0.1835 0.1764 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.1555 0.1640 0.1236 0.1620 0.1361 0.1488 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.1543 0.1478 0.1352 0.1497 0.1798 0.1542 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.1215 0.1409 0.1116 0.1455 0.1372 0.1315 
x x x 43 Zip Codes 0.1397 0.1442 0.1224 0.1511 0.1393 0.1395 
x x x Chicago 0.1317 0.1392 0.1217 0.1464 0.1361 0.1352 
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x x x Difference 0.0080 0.0050 0.0007 0.0047 0.0032 0.0043 
 
 
3. Appeals Rate (x100), By 28 Lower-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.0888 0.1041 0.0892 0.1036 0.1007 0.0973 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.0814 0.1037 0.0938 0.1002 0.0902 0.0942 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.1141 0.1245 0.1236 0.1306 0.1299 0.1245 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.1336 0.1530 0.1431 0.1616 0.1582 0.1502 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.2045 0.1679 0.1402 0.1830 0.1572 0.1715 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.1197 0.1300 0.1262 0.1396 0.1322 0.1295 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.1276 0.1424 0.1340 0.1516 0.1405 0.1395 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.1189 0.1426 0.1299 0.1421 0.1352 0.1340 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.0938 0.1091 0.1069 0.1085 0.1165 0.1068 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.0581 0.0740 0.0648 0.0845 0.0698 0.0702 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.0810 0.0934 0.0936 0.1099 0.1090 0.0975 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.1570 0.1609 0.1363 0.1728 0.1712 0.1595 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.1121 0.1277 0.1242 0.1402 0.1360 0.1280 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.0738 0.0905 0.0751 0.0950 0.0849 0.0839 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.0574 0.0667 0.0555 0.0768 0.0666 0.0644 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.1535 0.1615 0.1430 0.1531 0.1549 0.1531 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.0963 0.1065 0.0988 0.1159 0.1077 0.1051 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.1163 0.1264 0.1276 0.1457 0.1371 0.1306 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.0761 0.0937 0.0848 0.0950 0.0866 0.0873 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.1549 0.1609 0.1427 0.1788 0.1734 0.1622 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.0884 0.1176 0.1154 0.1289 0.1168 0.1143 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.1793 0.1814 0.1674 0.1844 0.1856 0.1797 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.1197 0.1329 0.1291 0.1440 0.1302 0.1315 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.0828 0.1088 0.0986 0.1164 0.1065 0.1030 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.1175 0.1320 0.1244 0.1431 0.1344 0.1306 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.2011 0.1877 0.1745 0.1960 0.2124 0.1944 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.1810 0.1785 0.1572 0.1807 0.1835 0.1764 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.1139 0.1193 0.1155 0.1253 0.1166 0.1183 
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x x x 28 Zip Codes 0.1179 0.1285 0.1184 0.1360 0.1301 0.1263 
x x x Chicago 0.1317 0.1392 0.1217 0.1464 0.1361 0.1352 
x x x Difference -0.0138 -0.0107 -0.0033 -0.0104 -0.0060 -0.0089 
4. Appeals Rate (x100), By 31 Higher-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.1277 0.1397 0.1300 0.1692 0.1463 0.1422 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.1702 0.1270 0.1050 0.1405 0.0989 0.1305 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.1856 0.1753 0.1212 0.1636 0.1188 0.1534 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.1309 0.1150 0.0900 0.1201 0.1075 0.1123 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.1861 0.1786 0.1460 0.1944 0.1633 0.1746 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.1271 0.1410 0.1081 0.1320 0.1348 0.1288 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.1383 0.1542 0.1200 0.1664 0.1485 0.1454 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.1559 0.1715 0.1380 0.1865 0.1616 0.1628 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.1510 0.1491 0.1348 0.1708 0.1631 0.1532 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.1470 0.1557 0.1367 0.1742 0.1625 0.1553 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.1516 0.1680 0.1403 0.1802 0.1594 0.1596 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.1189 0.1340 0.1191 0.1419 0.1359 0.1301 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.1120 0.1188 0.1042 0.1326 0.1214 0.1177 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.1335 0.1359 0.1234 0.1443 0.1375 0.1350 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.1496 0.1448 0.1346 0.1587 0.1548 0.1485 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.1753 0.1729 0.1347 0.1833 0.1538 0.1639 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.1253 0.1284 0.1126 0.1390 0.1205 0.1252 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.1393 0.1407 0.1041 0.1461 0.1208 0.1305 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.1209 0.1245 0.1118 0.1274 0.1292 0.1228 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.1307 0.1410 0.1113 0.1497 0.1246 0.1316 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.1269 0.1456 0.1272 0.1413 0.1360 0.1356 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.1675 0.1660 0.1373 0.1611 0.1678 0.1601 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.1053 0.1130 0.0995 0.1194 0.1094 0.1093 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.1139 0.1277 0.1100 0.1265 0.1238 0.1205 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.1508 0.1494 0.1267 0.1623 0.1401 0.1459 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.1413 0.1688 0.1423 0.1588 0.1407 0.1506 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.2061 0.2155 0.1943 0.2078 0.2013 0.2052 
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60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.1468 0.1584 0.1320 0.1772 0.1527 0.1534 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.1555 0.1640 0.1236 0.1620 0.1361 0.1488 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.1543 0.1478 0.1352 0.1497 0.1798 0.1542 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.1215 0.1409 0.1116 0.1455 0.1372 0.1315 
x x x 31 Zip Codes 0.1441 0.1488 0.1247 0.1559 0.1416 0.1432 
x x x Chicago 0.1317 0.1392 0.1217 0.1464 0.1361 0.1352 
x x x Difference 0.0124 0.0096 0.0030 0.0095 0.0055 0.0080 
 
5. Appeals Rate (x100), By 25 Southside Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.1861 0.1786 0.1460 0.1944 0.1633 0.1746 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.1383 0.1542 0.1200 0.1664 0.1485 0.1454 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.0888 0.1041 0.0892 0.1036 0.1007 0.0973 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.0814 0.1037 0.0938 0.1002 0.0902 0.0942 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.1336 0.1530 0.1431 0.1616 0.1582 0.1502 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.2045 0.1679 0.1402 0.1830 0.1572 0.1715 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.1197 0.1300 0.1262 0.1396 0.1322 0.1295 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.1276 0.1424 0.1340 0.1516 0.1405 0.1395 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.1189 0.1426 0.1299 0.1421 0.1352 0.1340 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.0938 0.1091 0.1069 0.1085 0.1165 0.1068 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.0581 0.0740 0.0648 0.0845 0.0698 0.0702 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.1121 0.1277 0.1242 0.1402 0.1360 0.1280 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.0738 0.0905 0.0751 0.0950 0.0849 0.0839 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.0574 0.0667 0.0555 0.0768 0.0666 0.0644 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.1535 0.1615 0.1430 0.1531 0.1549 0.1531 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.0963 0.1065 0.0988 0.1159 0.1077 0.1051 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.1163 0.1264 0.1276 0.1457 0.1371 0.1306 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.1393 0.1407 0.1041 0.1461 0.1208 0.1305 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.1307 0.1410 0.1113 0.1497 0.1246 0.1316 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.1269 0.1456 0.1272 0.1413 0.1360 0.1356 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.1197 0.1329 0.1291 0.1440 0.1302 0.1315 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.1139 0.1277 0.1100 0.1265 0.1238 0.1205 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.1175 0.1320 0.1244 0.1431 0.1344 0.1306 
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60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.1413 0.1688 0.1423 0.1588 0.1407 0.1506 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.1139 0.1193 0.1155 0.1253 0.1166 0.1183 
x x x 25 Zip Codes 0.1185 0.1299 0.1153 0.1359 0.1251 0.1251 
x x x Chicago 0.1317 0.1392 0.1217 0.1464 0.1361 0.1352 
x x x Difference -0.0132 -0.0093 -0.0064 -0.0105 -0.011 -0.0101 
 
6. Appeals Rate (x100), By 34 Northside  Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-16 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.1277 0.1397 0.1300 0.1692 0.1463 0.1422 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.1702 0.1270 0.1050 0.1405 0.0989 0.1305 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.1856 0.1753 0.1212 0.1636 0.1188 0.1534 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.1309 0.1150 0.0900 0.1201 0.1075 0.1123 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.1271 0.1410 0.1081 0.1320 0.1348 0.1288 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.1559 0.1715 0.1380 0.1865 0.1616 0.1628 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.1510 0.1491 0.1348 0.1708 0.1631 0.1532 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.1141 0.1245 0.1236 0.1306 0.1299 0.1245 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.1470 0.1557 0.1367 0.1742 0.1625 0.1553 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.1516 0.1680 0.1403 0.1802 0.1594 0.1596 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.1189 0.1340 0.1191 0.1419 0.1359 0.1301 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.1120 0.1188 0.1042 0.1326 0.1214 0.1177 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.0810 0.0934 0.0936 0.1099 0.1090 0.0975 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.1335 0.1359 0.1234 0.1443 0.1375 0.1350 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.1570 0.1609 0.1363 0.1728 0.1712 0.1595 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.1496 0.1448 0.1346 0.1587 0.1548 0.1485 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.1753 0.1729 0.1347 0.1833 0.1538 0.1639 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.1253 0.1284 0.1126 0.1390 0.1205 0.1252 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.0761 0.0937 0.0848 0.0950 0.0866 0.0873 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.1549 0.1609 0.1427 0.1788 0.1734 0.1622 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.1209 0.1245 0.1118 0.1274 0.1292 0.1228 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.0884 0.1176 0.1154 0.1289 0.1168 0.1143 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.1793 0.1814 0.1674 0.1844 0.1856 0.1797 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.1675 0.1660 0.1373 0.1611 0.1678 0.1601 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.1053 0.1130 0.0995 0.1194 0.1094 0.1093 
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60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.0828 0.1088 0.0986 0.1164 0.1065 0.1030 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.1508 0.1494 0.1267 0.1623 0.1401 0.1459 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.2061 0.2155 0.1943 0.2078 0.2013 0.2052 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.1468 0.1584 0.1320 0.1772 0.1527 0.1534 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.2011 0.1877 0.1745 0.1960 0.2124 0.1944 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.1810 0.1785 0.1572 0.1807 0.1835 0.1764 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.1555 0.1640 0.1236 0.1620 0.1361 0.1488 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.1543 0.1478 0.1352 0.1497 0.1798 0.1542 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.1215 0.1409 0.1116 0.1455 0.1372 0.1315 
x x x 34 Zip Codes 0.1413 0.1460 0.1264 0.1542 0.1443 0.1426 
x x x Chicago 0.1317 0.1392 0.1217 0.1464 0.1361 0.1352 
x x x Difference 0.0096 0.0068 0.0047 0.0078 0.0082 0.0074 
 
  
2018] UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OR PERSONALIZED LAW ?  97 
 
  
 
 
E. Successful Appeals Rate (x100), By All 59 City of Chicago Zip Codes, 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-16 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.0741 0.0801 0.0775 0.1030 0.0900 0.0845 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.1159 0.0742 0.0705 0.0793 0.0632 0.0824 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.1349 0.1280 0.0870 0.0964 0.0745 0.1049 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.0509 0.0705 0.0554 0.0776 0.0570 0.0620 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.1017 0.0966 0.0866 0.1237 0.0953 0.1011 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.0744 0.0844 0.0688 0.0679 0.0734 0.0742 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.0730 0.0831 0.0710 0.1037 0.0860 0.0832 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.0523 0.0618 0.0548 0.0656 0.0614 0.0592 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.0506 0.0667 0.0624 0.0664 0.0567 0.0608 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.0879 0.1019 0.0872 0.1179 0.0974 0.0985 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.0801 0.0768 0.0831 0.1053 0.0974 0.0877 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.0665 0.0788 0.0816 0.0830 0.0779 0.0777 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.0811 0.0856 0.0803 0.1086 0.1002 0.0911 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.0804 0.0909 0.0853 0.1123 0.0929 0.0918 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.0765 0.0893 0.0888 0.1004 0.0938 0.0900 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.1363 0.1025 0.0874 0.1184 0.0983 0.1093 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.0729 0.0811 0.0811 0.0933 0.0799 0.0818 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.0683 0.0851 0.0775 0.0924 0.0896 0.0827 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.0761 0.0903 0.0865 0.1003 0.0864 0.0883 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.0740 0.0891 0.0844 0.0943 0.0831 0.0853 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.0572 0.0712 0.0716 0.0712 0.0718 0.0687 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.0623 0.0648 0.0613 0.0838 0.0736 0.0689 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.0362 0.0478 0.0432 0.0567 0.0444 0.0457 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.0476 0.0626 0.0638 0.0733 0.0676 0.0633 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.0827 0.0807 0.0790 0.0950 0.0869 0.0849 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.1015 0.1049 0.0907 0.1146 0.1157 0.1053 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.0672 0.0804 0.0824 0.0938 0.0850 0.0819 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.0436 0.0583 0.0474 0.0611 0.0525 0.0526 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.0918 0.0891 0.0862 0.1036 0.1021 0.0945 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.1024 0.1036 0.0810 0.1190 0.0911 0.0994 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.0340 0.0408 0.0356 0.0504 0.0445 0.0408 
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60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.0911 0.1056 0.0957 0.1076 0.1016 0.1005 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.0733 0.0754 0.0698 0.0879 0.0742 0.0762 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.0606 0.0701 0.0663 0.0789 0.0673 0.0689 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.0684 0.0802 0.0846 0.0962 0.0848 0.0831 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.0838 0.0871 0.0620 0.0908 0.0751 0.0799 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.0470 0.0615 0.0559 0.0618 0.0539 0.0561 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.0929 0.0966 0.0914 0.1215 0.1127 0.1030 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.0745 0.0792 0.0728 0.0828 0.0839 0.0787 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.0684 0.0787 0.0653 0.0927 0.0733 0.0757 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.0773 0.0886 0.0807 0.0888 0.0810 0.0835 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.0541 0.0786 0.0806 0.0884 0.0715 0.0756 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.1148 0.1144 0.1123 0.1227 0.1238 0.1176 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.1009 0.0987 0.0875 0.1032 0.1044 0.0989 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.0592 0.0673 0.0598 0.0765 0.0676 0.0660 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.0724 0.0816 0.0806 0.0926 0.0782 0.0814 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.0486 0.0708 0.0668 0.0767 0.0686 0.0667 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.0647 0.0760 0.0680 0.0801 0.0734 0.0726 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.0690 0.0810 0.0783 0.0897 0.0821 0.0803 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.0805 0.0802 0.0732 0.0970 0.0822 0.0824 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.0787 0.0948 0.0910 0.0975 0.0818 0.0889 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.1462 0.1479 0.1426 0.1468 0.1489 0.1466 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.0779 0.0848 0.0767 0.1103 0.0917 0.0879 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.1358 0.1234 0.1217 0.1373 0.1539 0.1345 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.1174 0.1103 0.1052 0.1245 0.1235 0.1161 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.0796 0.0893 0.0761 0.0973 0.0808 0.0847 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.1058 0.0893 0.0946 0.1043 0.1372 0.1071 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.0778 0.0907 0.0733 0.0973 0.0921 0.0863 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.0740 0.0764 0.0798 0.0822 0.0728 0.0773 
x x x Chicago 0.0788 0.0847 0.0782 0.0943 0.0853 0.0844 
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1. Successful Appeals Rate (x100), By 16 Majority-Black Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.0665 0.0788 0.0816 0.0830 0.0779 0.0777 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.0765 0.0893 0.0888 0.1004 0.0938 0.0900 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.0729 0.0811 0.0811 0.0933 0.0799 0.0818 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.0761 0.0903 0.0865 0.1003 0.0864 0.0883 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.0740 0.0891 0.0844 0.0943 0.0831 0.0853 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.0572 0.0712 0.0716 0.0712 0.0718 0.0687 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.0476 0.0626 0.0638 0.0733 0.0676 0.0633 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.0672 0.0804 0.0824 0.0938 0.0850 0.0819 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.0606 0.0701 0.0663 0.0789 0.0673 0.0689 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.0684 0.0802 0.0846 0.0962 0.0848 0.0831 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.0773 0.0886 0.0807 0.0888 0.0810 0.0835 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.0541 0.0786 0.0806 0.0884 0.0715 0.0756 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.0724 0.0816 0.0806 0.0926 0.0782 0.0814 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.0486 0.0708 0.0668 0.0767 0.0686 0.0667 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.0690 0.0810 0.0783 0.0897 0.0821 0.0803 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.0740 0.0764 0.0798 0.0822 0.0728 0.0773 
x x x 16 Zip Codes 0.0664 0.0794 0.0786 0.0877 0.0782 0.0783 
x x x Chicago 0.0788 0.0847 0.0782 0.0943 0.0853 0.0844 
x x x Difference -0.0124 -0.0053 0.0004 -0.0066 -0.0071 -0.0061 
 
2. Successful Appeals Rate (x100), By 43 Majority-Other Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.0741 0.0801 0.0775 0.1030 0.0900 0.0845 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.1159 0.0742 0.0705 0.0793 0.0632 0.0824 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.1349 0.1280 0.0870 0.0964 0.0745 0.1049 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.0509 0.0705 0.0554 0.0776 0.0570 0.0620 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.1017 0.0966 0.0866 0.1237 0.0953 0.1011 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.0744 0.0844 0.0688 0.0679 0.0734 0.0742 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.0730 0.0831 0.0710 0.1037 0.0860 0.0832 
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60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.0523 0.0618 0.0548 0.0656 0.0614 0.0592 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.0506 0.0667 0.0624 0.0664 0.0567 0.0608 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.0879 0.1019 0.0872 0.1179 0.0974 0.0985 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.0801 0.0768 0.0831 0.1053 0.0974 0.0877 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.0811 0.0856 0.0803 0.1086 0.1002 0.0911 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.0804 0.0909 0.0853 0.1123 0.0929 0.0918 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.1363 0.1025 0.0874 0.1184 0.0983 0.1093 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.0683 0.0851 0.0775 0.0924 0.0896 0.0827 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.0623 0.0648 0.0613 0.0838 0.0736 0.0689 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.0362 0.0478 0.0432 0.0567 0.0444 0.0457 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.0827 0.0807 0.0790 0.0950 0.0869 0.0849 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.1015 0.1049 0.0907 0.1146 0.1157 0.1053 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.0436 0.0583 0.0474 0.0611 0.0525 0.0526 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.0918 0.0891 0.0862 0.1036 0.1021 0.0945 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.1024 0.1036 0.0810 0.1190 0.0911 0.0994 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.0340 0.0408 0.0356 0.0504 0.0445 0.0408 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.0911 0.1056 0.0957 0.1076 0.1016 0.1005 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.0733 0.0754 0.0698 0.0879 0.0742 0.0762 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.0838 0.0871 0.0620 0.0908 0.0751 0.0799 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.0470 0.0615 0.0559 0.0618 0.0539 0.0561 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.0929 0.0966 0.0914 0.1215 0.1127 0.1030 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.0745 0.0792 0.0728 0.0828 0.0839 0.0787 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.0684 0.0787 0.0653 0.0927 0.0733 0.0757 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.1148 0.1144 0.1123 0.1227 0.1238 0.1176 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.1009 0.0987 0.0875 0.1032 0.1044 0.0989 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.0592 0.0673 0.0598 0.0765 0.0676 0.0660 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.0647 0.0760 0.0680 0.0801 0.0734 0.0726 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.0805 0.0802 0.0732 0.0970 0.0822 0.0824 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.0787 0.0948 0.0910 0.0975 0.0818 0.0889 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.1462 0.1479 0.1426 0.1468 0.1489 0.1466 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.0779 0.0848 0.0767 0.1103 0.0917 0.0879 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.1358 0.1234 0.1217 0.1373 0.1539 0.1345 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.1174 0.1103 0.1052 0.1245 0.1235 0.1161 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.0796 0.0893 0.0761 0.0973 0.0808 0.0847 
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60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.1058 0.0893 0.0946 0.1043 0.1372 0.1071 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.0778 0.0907 0.0733 0.0973 0.0921 0.0863 
x x x 43 Zip Codes 0.0834 0.0867 0.0780 0.0968 0.0879 0.0866 
x x x Chicago 0.0788 0.0847 0.0782 0.0943 0.0853 0.0844 
x x x Difference 0.0046 0.0020 -0.0002 0.0025 0.0026 0.0022 
 
3. Successful Appeals Rate (x100), By 28 Lower-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012-16 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.0523 0.0618 0.0548 0.0656 0.0614 0.0592 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.0506 0.0667 0.0624 0.0664 0.0567 0.0608 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.0665 0.0788 0.0816 0.0830 0.0779 0.0777 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.0765 0.0893 0.0888 0.1004 0.0938 0.0900 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.1363 0.1025 0.0874 0.1184 0.0983 0.1093 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.0729 0.0811 0.0811 0.0933 0.0799 0.0818 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.0761 0.0903 0.0865 0.1003 0.0864 0.0883 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.0740 0.0891 0.0844 0.0943 0.0831 0.0853 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.0572 0.0712 0.0716 0.0712 0.0718 0.0687 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.0362 0.0478 0.0432 0.0567 0.0444 0.0457 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.0476 0.0626 0.0638 0.0733 0.0676 0.0633 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.1015 0.1049 0.0907 0.1146 0.1157 0.1053 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.0672 0.0804 0.0824 0.0938 0.0850 0.0819 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.0436 0.0583 0.0474 0.0611 0.0525 0.0526 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.0340 0.0408 0.0356 0.0504 0.0445 0.0408 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.0911 0.1056 0.0957 0.1076 0.1016 0.1005 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.0606 0.0701 0.0663 0.0789 0.0673 0.0689 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.0684 0.0802 0.0846 0.0962 0.0848 0.0831 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.0470 0.0615 0.0559 0.0618 0.0539 0.0561 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.0929 0.0966 0.0914 0.1215 0.1127 0.1030 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.0541 0.0786 0.0806 0.0884 0.0715 0.0756 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.1148 0.1144 0.1123 0.1227 0.1238 0.1176 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.0724 0.0816 0.0806 0.0926 0.0782 0.0814 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.0486 0.0708 0.0668 0.0767 0.0686 0.0667 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.0690 0.0810 0.0783 0.0897 0.0821 0.0803 
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60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.1358 0.1234 0.1217 0.1373 0.1539 0.1345 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.1174 0.1103 0.1052 0.1245 0.1235 0.1161 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.0740 0.0764 0.0798 0.0822 0.0728 0.0773 
x x x 28 Zip Codes 0.0728 0.0813 0.0779 0.0901 0.0826 0.0811 
x x x Chicago 0.0788 0.0847 0.0782 0.0943 0.0853 0.0844 
x x x Difference -0.0060 -0.0034 -0.0003 -0.0042 -0.0027 -0.0033 
4. Successful Appeals Rate (x100), By 31 Higher-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012-16 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-
2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.0741 0.0801 0.0775 0.1030 0.0900 0.0845 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.1159 0.0742 0.0705 0.0793 0.0632 0.0824 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.1349 0.1280 0.0870 0.0964 0.0745 0.1049 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.0509 0.0705 0.0554 0.0776 0.0570 0.0620 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.1017 0.0966 0.0866 0.1237 0.0953 0.1011 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.0744 0.0844 0.0688 0.0679 0.0734 0.0742 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.0730 0.0831 0.0710 0.1037 0.0860 0.0832 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.0879 0.1019 0.0872 0.1179 0.0974 0.0985 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.0801 0.0768 0.0831 0.1053 0.0974 0.0877 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.0811 0.0856 0.0803 0.1086 0.1002 0.0911 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.0804 0.0909 0.0853 0.1123 0.0929 0.0918 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.0683 0.0851 0.0775 0.0924 0.0896 0.0827 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.0623 0.0648 0.0613 0.0838 0.0736 0.0689 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.0827 0.0807 0.0790 0.0950 0.0869 0.0849 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.0918 0.0891 0.0862 0.1036 0.1021 0.0945 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.1024 0.1036 0.0810 0.1190 0.0911 0.0994 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.0733 0.0754 0.0698 0.0879 0.0742 0.0762 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.0838 0.0871 0.0620 0.0908 0.0751 0.0799 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.0745 0.0792 0.0728 0.0828 0.0839 0.0787 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.0684 0.0787 0.0653 0.0927 0.0733 0.0757 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.0773 0.0886 0.0807 0.0888 0.0810 0.0835 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.1009 0.0987 0.0875 0.1032 0.1044 0.0989 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.0592 0.0673 0.0598 0.0765 0.0676 0.0660 
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60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.0647 0.0760 0.0680 0.0801 0.0734 0.0726 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.0805 0.0802 0.0732 0.0970 0.0822 0.0824 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.0787 0.0948 0.0910 0.0975 0.0818 0.0889 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.1462 0.1479 0.1426 0.1468 0.1489 0.1466 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.0779 0.0848 0.0767 0.1103 0.0917 0.0879 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.0796 0.0893 0.0761 0.0973 0.0808 0.0847 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.1058 0.0893 0.0946 0.1043 0.1372 0.1071 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.0778 0.0907 0.0733 0.0973 0.0921 0.0863 
x x x 31 Zip Codes 0.0842 0.0879 0.0784 0.0982 0.0877 0.0873 
x x x Chicago 0.0788 0.0847 0.0782 0.0943 0.0853 0.0844 
x x x Difference 0.0054 0.0032 0.0002 0.0039 0.0024 0.0029 
 
5. Successful Appeals Rate (x100), By 25 Southside Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012-2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-16 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.1017 0.0966 0.0866 0.1237 0.0953 0.1011 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.0730 0.0831 0.0710 0.1037 0.0860 0.0832 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.0523 0.0618 0.0548 0.0656 0.0614 0.0592 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.0506 0.0667 0.0624 0.0664 0.0567 0.0608 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.0765 0.0893 0.0888 0.1004 0.0938 0.0900 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.1363 0.1025 0.0874 0.1184 0.0983 0.1093 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.0729 0.0811 0.0811 0.0933 0.0799 0.0818 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.0761 0.0903 0.0865 0.1003 0.0864 0.0883 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.0740 0.0891 0.0844 0.0943 0.0831 0.0853 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.0572 0.0712 0.0716 0.0712 0.0718 0.0687 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.0362 0.0478 0.0432 0.0567 0.0444 0.0457 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.0672 0.0804 0.0824 0.0938 0.0850 0.0819 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.0436 0.0583 0.0474 0.0611 0.0525 0.0526 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.0340 0.0408 0.0356 0.0504 0.0445 0.0408 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.0911 0.1056 0.0957 0.1076 0.1016 0.1005 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.0606 0.0701 0.0663 0.0789 0.0673 0.0689 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.0684 0.0802 0.0846 0.0962 0.0848 0.0831 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.0838 0.0871 0.0620 0.0908 0.0751 0.0799 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.0684 0.0787 0.0653 0.0927 0.0733 0.0757 
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60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.0773 0.0886 0.0807 0.0888 0.0810 0.0835 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.0724 0.0816 0.0806 0.0926 0.0782 0.0814 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.0647 0.0760 0.0680 0.0801 0.0734 0.0726 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.0690 0.0810 0.0783 0.0897 0.0821 0.0803 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.0787 0.0948 0.0910 0.0975 0.0818 0.0889 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.0740 0.0764 0.0798 0.0822 0.0728 0.0773 
x x x 25 Zip Codes 0.0704 0.0792 0.0734 0.0879 0.0764 0.0776 
x x x Chicago 0.0788 0.0847 0.0782 0.0943 0.0853 0.0844 
x x x Difference -0.0084 -0.0055 -0.0048 -0.0064 -0.0089 -0.0068 
 
6. Successful Appeals Rate (x100), By 34 Northside  Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012-2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.0741 0.0801 0.0775 0.1030 0.0900 0.0845 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.1159 0.0742 0.0705 0.0793 0.0632 0.0824 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.1349 0.1280 0.0870 0.0964 0.0745 0.1049 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.0509 0.0705 0.0554 0.0776 0.0570 0.0620 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.0744 0.0844 0.0688 0.0679 0.0734 0.0742 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.0879 0.1019 0.0872 0.1179 0.0974 0.0985 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.0801 0.0768 0.0831 0.1053 0.0974 0.0877 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.0665 0.0788 0.0816 0.0830 0.0779 0.0777 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.0811 0.0856 0.0803 0.1086 0.1002 0.0911 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.0804 0.0909 0.0853 0.1123 0.0929 0.0918 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.0683 0.0851 0.0775 0.0924 0.0896 0.0827 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.0623 0.0648 0.0613 0.0838 0.0736 0.0689 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.0476 0.0626 0.0638 0.0733 0.0676 0.0633 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.0827 0.0807 0.0790 0.0950 0.0869 0.0849 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.1015 0.1049 0.0907 0.1146 0.1157 0.1053 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.0918 0.0891 0.0862 0.1036 0.1021 0.0945 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.1024 0.1036 0.0810 0.1190 0.0911 0.0994 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.0733 0.0754 0.0698 0.0879 0.0742 0.0762 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.0470 0.0615 0.0559 0.0618 0.0539 0.0561 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.0929 0.0966 0.0914 0.1215 0.1127 0.1030 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.0745 0.0792 0.0728 0.0828 0.0839 0.0787 
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60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.0541 0.0786 0.0806 0.0884 0.0715 0.0756 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.1148 0.1144 0.1123 0.1227 0.1238 0.1176 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.1009 0.0987 0.0875 0.1032 0.1044 0.0989 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.0592 0.0673 0.0598 0.0765 0.0676 0.0660 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.0486 0.0708 0.0668 0.0767 0.0686 0.0667 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.0805 0.0802 0.0732 0.0970 0.0822 0.0824 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.1462 0.1479 0.1426 0.1468 0.1489 0.1466 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.0779 0.0848 0.0767 0.1103 0.0917 0.0879 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.1358 0.1234 0.1217 0.1373 0.1539 0.1345 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.1174 0.1103 0.1052 0.1245 0.1235 0.1161 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.0796 0.0893 0.0761 0.0973 0.0808 0.0847 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.1058 0.0893 0.0946 0.1043 0.1372 0.1071 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.0778 0.0907 0.0733 0.0973 0.0921 0.0863 
x x x 34 Zip Codes 0.0850 0.0888 0.0817 0.0991 0.0918 0.0894 
x x x Chicago 0.0788 0.0847 0.0782 0.0943 0.0853 0.0844 
x x x Difference 0.0062 0.0041 0.0035 0.0048 0.0065 0.0050 
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F. Win Rate On Appeal (x100), By All 59 City of Chicago Zip Codes, 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-16 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.5800 0.5732 0.5957 0.6085 0.6152 0.5946 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.6812 0.5843 0.6716 0.5647 0.6393 0.6318 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.7264 0.7304 0.7183 0.5889 0.6269 0.6837 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.3889 0.6129 0.6154 0.6462 0.5303 0.5521 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.5464 0.5412 0.5932 0.6366 0.5833 0.5789 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.5850 0.5991 0.6370 0.5145 0.5444 0.5758 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.5275 0.5392 0.5916 0.6232 0.5792 0.5721 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.5889 0.5938 0.6141 0.6333 0.6103 0.6082 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.6215 0.6432 0.6649 0.6621 0.6286 0.6452 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.5642 0.5944 0.6324 0.6323 0.6032 0.6047 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.5308 0.5147 0.6168 0.6165 0.5974 0.5726 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.5827 0.6328 0.6605 0.6357 0.5995 0.6237 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.5516 0.5499 0.5875 0.6236 0.6167 0.5867 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.5301 0.5410 0.6078 0.6231 0.5825 0.5751 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.5724 0.5839 0.6206 0.6211 0.5932 0.5990 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.6664 0.6106 0.6235 0.6468 0.6254 0.6375 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.6092 0.6235 0.6426 0.6683 0.6044 0.6313 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.5745 0.6355 0.6505 0.6513 0.6596 0.6357 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.5964 0.6339 0.6456 0.6615 0.6148 0.6327 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.6222 0.6249 0.6500 0.6637 0.6149 0.6363 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.6101 0.6528 0.6696 0.6562 0.6161 0.6430 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.5561 0.5453 0.5883 0.6317 0.6064 0.5858 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.6236 0.6466 0.6667 0.6708 0.6359 0.6505 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.5876 0.6706 0.6819 0.6667 0.6198 0.6496 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.6196 0.5941 0.6403 0.6583 0.6316 0.6287 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.6467 0.6518 0.6657 0.6630 0.6761 0.6602 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.5994 0.6292 0.6631 0.6692 0.6249 0.6394 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.5902 0.6443 0.6315 0.6432 0.6182 0.6272 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.6137 0.6151 0.6405 0.6524 0.6595 0.6366 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.5840 0.5989 0.6017 0.6493 0.5924 0.6064 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.5913 0.6119 0.6416 0.6564 0.6680 0.6340 
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60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.5938 0.6538 0.6697 0.7027 0.6560 0.6567 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.5854 0.5877 0.6201 0.6319 0.6160 0.6087 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.6291 0.6581 0.6713 0.6813 0.6251 0.6551 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.5885 0.6350 0.6631 0.6605 0.6185 0.6360 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.6015 0.6191 0.5956 0.6213 0.6213 0.6127 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.6177 0.6565 0.6590 0.6508 0.6227 0.6425 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.5996 0.6002 0.6405 0.6793 0.6499 0.6348 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.6167 0.6360 0.6506 0.6501 0.6494 0.6407 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.5236 0.5577 0.5869 0.6190 0.5880 0.5748 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.6091 0.6082 0.6344 0.6283 0.5959 0.6157 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.6117 0.6681 0.6983 0.6855 0.6126 0.6618 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.6400 0.6307 0.6707 0.6657 0.6671 0.6543 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.6024 0.5945 0.6372 0.6406 0.6220 0.6179 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.5624 0.5954 0.6010 0.6404 0.6177 0.6039 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.6050 0.6140 0.6248 0.6431 0.6005 0.6189 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.5867 0.6504 0.6772 0.6592 0.6442 0.6473 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.5679 0.5952 0.6185 0.6331 0.5932 0.6022 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.5870 0.6134 0.6296 0.6267 0.6109 0.6148 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.5339 0.5368 0.5781 0.5977 0.5865 0.5646 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.5572 0.5613 0.6396 0.6143 0.5814 0.5901 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.7094 0.6864 0.7339 0.7062 0.7397 0.7143 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.5305 0.5352 0.5809 0.6225 0.6002 0.5734 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.6753 0.6575 0.6977 0.7005 0.7244 0.6917 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.6487 0.6177 0.6691 0.6893 0.6727 0.6586 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.5119 0.5447 0.6163 0.6004 0.5938 0.5696 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.6857 0.6046 0.6995 0.6964 0.7628 0.6946 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.6398 0.6437 0.6567 0.6689 0.6711 0.6566 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.6495 0.6403 0.6909 0.6561 0.6246 0.6536 
x x x Chicago 0.5956 0.6106 0.6414 0.6443 0.6235 0.6238 
 
1. Win Rate On Appeal (x100), By 16 Majority-Black Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.5827 0.6328 0.6605 0.6357 0.5995 0.6237 
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60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.5724 0.5839 0.6206 0.6211 0.5932 0.5990 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.6092 0.6235 0.6426 0.6683 0.6044 0.6313 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.5964 0.6339 0.6456 0.6615 0.6148 0.6327 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.6222 0.6249 0.6500 0.6637 0.6149 0.6363 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.6101 0.6528 0.6696 0.6562 0.6161 0.6430 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.5876 0.6706 0.6819 0.6667 0.6198 0.6496 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.5994 0.6292 0.6631 0.6692 0.6249 0.6394 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.6291 0.6581 0.6713 0.6813 0.6251 0.6551 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.5885 0.6350 0.6631 0.6605 0.6185 0.6360 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.6091 0.6082 0.6344 0.6283 0.5959 0.6157 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.6117 0.6681 0.6983 0.6855 0.6126 0.6618 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.6050 0.6140 0.6248 0.6431 0.6005 0.6189 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.5867 0.6504 0.6772 0.6592 0.6442 0.6473 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.5870 0.6134 0.6296 0.6267 0.6109 0.6148 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.6495 0.6403 0.6909 0.6561 0.6246 0.6536 
x x x 16 Zip Codes 0.6029 0.6337 0.6577 0.6552 0.6137 0.6349 
x x x Chicago 0.5956 0.6106 0.6414 0.6443 0.6235 0.6238 
x x x Difference 0.0073 0.0231 0.0163 0.0109 -0.0098 0.0111 
 
2. Win Rate On Appeal (x100), By 43 Majority-Other Zip Codes (RACE), 2012 to 2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.5800 0.5732 0.5957 0.6085 0.6152 0.5946 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.6812 0.5843 0.6716 0.5647 0.6393 0.6318 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.7264 0.7304 0.7183 0.5889 0.6269 0.6837 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.3889 0.6129 0.6154 0.6462 0.5303 0.5521 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.5464 0.5412 0.5932 0.6366 0.5833 0.5789 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.5850 0.5991 0.6370 0.5145 0.5444 0.5758 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.5275 0.5392 0.5916 0.6232 0.5792 0.5721 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.5889 0.5938 0.6141 0.6333 0.6103 0.6082 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.6215 0.6432 0.6649 0.6621 0.6286 0.6452 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.5642 0.5944 0.6324 0.6323 0.6032 0.6047 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.5308 0.5147 0.6168 0.6165 0.5974 0.5726 
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60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.5516 0.5499 0.5875 0.6236 0.6167 0.5867 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.5301 0.5410 0.6078 0.6231 0.5825 0.5751 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.6664 0.6106 0.6235 0.6468 0.6254 0.6375 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.5745 0.6355 0.6505 0.6513 0.6596 0.6357 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.5561 0.5453 0.5883 0.6317 0.6064 0.5858 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.6236 0.6466 0.6667 0.6708 0.6359 0.6505 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.6196 0.5941 0.6403 0.6583 0.6316 0.6287 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.6467 0.6518 0.6657 0.6630 0.6761 0.6602 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.5902 0.6443 0.6315 0.6432 0.6182 0.6272 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.6137 0.6151 0.6405 0.6524 0.6595 0.6366 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.5840 0.5989 0.6017 0.6493 0.5924 0.6064 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.5913 0.6119 0.6416 0.6564 0.6680 0.6340 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.5938 0.6538 0.6697 0.7027 0.6560 0.6567 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.5854 0.5877 0.6201 0.6319 0.6160 0.6087 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.6015 0.6191 0.5956 0.6213 0.6213 0.6127 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.6177 0.6565 0.6590 0.6508 0.6227 0.6425 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.5996 0.6002 0.6405 0.6793 0.6499 0.6348 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.6167 0.6360 0.6506 0.6501 0.6494 0.6407 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.5236 0.5577 0.5869 0.6190 0.5880 0.5748 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.6400 0.6307 0.6707 0.6657 0.6671 0.6543 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.6024 0.5945 0.6372 0.6406 0.6220 0.6179 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.5624 0.5954 0.6010 0.6404 0.6177 0.6039 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.5679 0.5952 0.6185 0.6331 0.5932 0.6022 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.5339 0.5368 0.5781 0.5977 0.5865 0.5646 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.5572 0.5613 0.6396 0.6143 0.5814 0.5901 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.7094 0.6864 0.7339 0.7062 0.7397 0.7143 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.5305 0.5352 0.5809 0.6225 0.6002 0.5734 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.6753 0.6575 0.6977 0.7005 0.7244 0.6917 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.6487 0.6177 0.6691 0.6893 0.6727 0.6586 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.5119 0.5447 0.6163 0.6004 0.5938 0.5696 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.6857 0.6046 0.6995 0.6964 0.7628 0.6946 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.6398 0.6437 0.6567 0.6689 0.6711 0.6566 
x x x 43 Zip Codes 0.5928 0.6020 0.6353 0.6402 0.6271 0.6197 
x x x Chicago 0.5956 0.6106 0.6414 0.6443 0.6235 0.6238 
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x x x Difference -0.0028 -0.0086 -0.0061 -0.0041 0.0036 -0.0041 
 
3. Win Rate On Appeal (x100), By 28 Lower-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012-2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.5889 0.5938 0.6141 0.6333 0.6103 0.6082 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.6215 0.6432 0.6649 0.6621 0.6286 0.6452 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.5827 0.6328 0.6605 0.6357 0.5995 0.6237 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.5724 0.5839 0.6206 0.6211 0.5932 0.5990 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.6664 0.6106 0.6235 0.6468 0.6254 0.6375 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.6092 0.6235 0.6426 0.6683 0.6044 0.6313 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.5964 0.6339 0.6456 0.6615 0.6148 0.6327 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.6222 0.6249 0.6500 0.6637 0.6149 0.6363 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.6101 0.6528 0.6696 0.6562 0.6161 0.6430 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.6236 0.6466 0.6667 0.6708 0.6359 0.6505 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.5876 0.6706 0.6819 0.6667 0.6198 0.6496 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.6467 0.6518 0.6657 0.6630 0.6761 0.6602 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.5994 0.6292 0.6631 0.6692 0.6249 0.6394 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.5902 0.6443 0.6315 0.6432 0.6182 0.6272 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.5913 0.6119 0.6416 0.6564 0.6680 0.6340 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.5938 0.6538 0.6697 0.7027 0.6560 0.6567 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.6291 0.6581 0.6713 0.6813 0.6251 0.6551 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.5885 0.6350 0.6631 0.6605 0.6185 0.6360 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.6177 0.6565 0.6590 0.6508 0.6227 0.6425 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.5996 0.6002 0.6405 0.6793 0.6499 0.6348 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.6117 0.6681 0.6983 0.6855 0.6126 0.6618 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.6400 0.6307 0.6707 0.6657 0.6671 0.6543 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.6050 0.6140 0.6248 0.6431 0.6005 0.6189 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.5867 0.6504 0.6772 0.6592 0.6442 0.6473 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.5870 0.6134 0.6296 0.6267 0.6109 0.6148 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.6753 0.6575 0.6977 0.7005 0.7244 0.6917 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.6487 0.6177 0.6691 0.6893 0.6727 0.6586 
60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.6495 0.6403 0.6909 0.6561 0.6246 0.6536 
x x x 28 Zip Codes 0.6122 0.6339 0.6573 0.6614 0.6314 0.6409 
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x x x Chicago 0.5956 0.6106 0.6414 0.6443 0.6235 0.6238 
x x x Difference 0.0166 0.0233 0.0159 0.0171 0.0079 0.0171 
4. Win Rate On Appeal (x100), By 31 Higher-Income Zip Codes (INCOME), 2012-2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.5800 0.5732 0.5957 0.6085 0.6152 0.5946 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.6812 0.5843 0.6716 0.5647 0.6393 0.6318 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.7264 0.7304 0.7183 0.5889 0.6269 0.6837 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.3889 0.6129 0.6154 0.6462 0.5303 0.5521 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.5464 0.5412 0.5932 0.6366 0.5833 0.5789 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.5850 0.5991 0.6370 0.5145 0.5444 0.5758 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.5275 0.5392 0.5916 0.6232 0.5792 0.5721 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.5642 0.5944 0.6324 0.6323 0.6032 0.6047 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.5308 0.5147 0.6168 0.6165 0.5974 0.5726 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.5516 0.5499 0.5875 0.6236 0.6167 0.5867 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.5301 0.5410 0.6078 0.6231 0.5825 0.5751 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.5745 0.6355 0.6505 0.6513 0.6596 0.6357 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.5561 0.5453 0.5883 0.6317 0.6064 0.5858 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.6196 0.5941 0.6403 0.6583 0.6316 0.6287 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.6137 0.6151 0.6405 0.6524 0.6595 0.6366 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.5840 0.5989 0.6017 0.6493 0.5924 0.6064 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.5854 0.5877 0.6201 0.6319 0.6160 0.6087 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.6015 0.6191 0.5956 0.6213 0.6213 0.6127 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.6167 0.6360 0.6506 0.6501 0.6494 0.6407 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.5236 0.5577 0.5869 0.6190 0.5880 0.5748 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.6091 0.6082 0.6344 0.6283 0.5959 0.6157 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.6024 0.5945 0.6372 0.6406 0.6220 0.6179 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.5624 0.5954 0.6010 0.6404 0.6177 0.6039 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.5679 0.5952 0.6185 0.6331 0.5932 0.6022 
60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.5339 0.5368 0.5781 0.5977 0.5865 0.5646 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.5572 0.5613 0.6396 0.6143 0.5814 0.5901 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.7094 0.6864 0.7339 0.7062 0.7397 0.7143 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.5305 0.5352 0.5809 0.6225 0.6002 0.5734 
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60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.5119 0.5447 0.6163 0.6004 0.5938 0.5696 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.6857 0.6046 0.6995 0.6964 0.7628 0.6946 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.6398 0.6437 0.6567 0.6689 0.6711 0.6566 
x x x 31 Zip Codes 0.5806 0.5895 0.6270 0.6288 0.6164 0.6084 
x x x Chicago 0.5956 0.6106 0.6414 0.6443 0.6235 0.6238 
x x x Difference -0.0150 -0.0211 -0.0144 -0.0155 -0.0071 -0.0154 
 
5. Win Rate On Appeal (x100), By 25 Southside Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012-2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60605 18.6 87668 Southside 0.5464 0.5412 0.5932 0.6366 0.5833 0.5789 
60607 16.3 85917 Southside 0.5275 0.5392 0.5916 0.6232 0.5792 0.5721 
60608 18.2 36216 Southside 0.5889 0.5938 0.6141 0.6333 0.6103 0.6082 
60609 28.9 32284 Southside 0.6215 0.6432 0.6649 0.6621 0.6286 0.6452 
60615 62.0 41108 Southside 0.5724 0.5839 0.6206 0.6211 0.5932 0.5990 
60616 26.0 42594 Southside 0.6664 0.6106 0.6235 0.6468 0.6254 0.6375 
60617 56.2 37796 Southside 0.6092 0.6235 0.6426 0.6683 0.6044 0.6313 
60619 97.4 32239 Southside 0.5964 0.6339 0.6456 0.6615 0.6148 0.6327 
60620 98.1 32168 Southside 0.6222 0.6249 0.6500 0.6637 0.6149 0.6363 
60621 97.9 19832 Southside 0.6101 0.6528 0.6696 0.6562 0.6161 0.6430 
60623 33.5 28091 Southside 0.6236 0.6466 0.6667 0.6708 0.6359 0.6505 
60628 94.7 36242 Southside 0.5994 0.6292 0.6631 0.6692 0.6249 0.6394 
60629 23.0 40712 Southside 0.5902 0.6443 0.6315 0.6432 0.6182 0.6272 
60632 2.1 38438 Southside 0.5913 0.6119 0.6416 0.6564 0.6680 0.6340 
60633 4.8 47136 Southside 0.5938 0.6538 0.6697 0.7027 0.6560 0.6567 
60636 96.3 27871 Southside 0.6291 0.6581 0.6713 0.6813 0.6251 0.6551 
60637 78.6 26845 Southside 0.5885 0.6350 0.6631 0.6605 0.6185 0.6360 
60638 4.0 62511 Southside 0.6015 0.6191 0.5956 0.6213 0.6213 0.6127 
60642 11.0 79633 Southside 0.5236 0.5577 0.5869 0.6190 0.5880 0.5748 
60643 74.5 59593 Southside 0.6091 0.6082 0.6344 0.6283 0.5959 0.6157 
60649 95.5 26797 Southside 0.6050 0.6140 0.6248 0.6431 0.6005 0.6189 
60652 45.8 61797 Southside 0.5679 0.5952 0.6185 0.6331 0.5932 0.6022 
60653 93.8 25923 Southside 0.5870 0.6134 0.6296 0.6267 0.6109 0.6148 
60655 7.7 87105 Southside 0.5572 0.5613 0.6396 0.6143 0.5814 0.5901 
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60827 96.8 31063 Southside 0.6495 0.6403 0.6909 0.6561 0.6246 0.6536 
x x x 25 Zip Codes 0.5951 0.6134 0.6377 0.6480 0.6133 0.6226 
x x x Chicago 0.5956 0.6106 0.6414 0.6443 0.6235 0.6238 
x x x Difference -0.0005 0.0028 -0.0037 0.0037 -0.0102 -0.0012 
 
6. Win Rate On Appeal (x100), By 34 Northside  Zip Codes (LOCATION), 2012-2016 
 
Zip Race Income Location 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016 
60601 6.8 102254 Northside 0.5800 0.5732 0.5957 0.6085 0.6152 0.5946 
60602 11.1 57368 Northside 0.6812 0.5843 0.6716 0.5647 0.6393 0.6318 
60603 2.8 122031 Northside 0.7264 0.7304 0.7183 0.5889 0.6269 0.6837 
60604 7.4 151731 Northside 0.3889 0.6129 0.6154 0.6462 0.5303 0.5521 
60606 4.3 106661 Northside 0.5850 0.5991 0.6370 0.5145 0.5444 0.5758 
60610 18.2 75892 Northside 0.5642 0.5944 0.6324 0.6323 0.6032 0.6047 
60611 4.4 87280 Northside 0.5308 0.5147 0.6168 0.6165 0.5974 0.5726 
60612 61.7 35888 Northside 0.5827 0.6328 0.6605 0.6357 0.5995 0.6237 
60613 7.8 72126 Northside 0.5516 0.5499 0.5875 0.6236 0.6167 0.5867 
60614 3.9 92714 Northside 0.5301 0.5410 0.6078 0.6231 0.5825 0.5751 
60618 3.5 57500 Northside 0.5745 0.6355 0.6505 0.6513 0.6596 0.6357 
60622 8.3 75163 Northside 0.5561 0.5453 0.5883 0.6317 0.6064 0.5858 
60624 95.3 22204 Northside 0.5876 0.6706 0.6819 0.6667 0.6198 0.6496 
60625 4.7 56507 Northside 0.6196 0.5941 0.6403 0.6583 0.6316 0.6287 
60626 25.9 36439 Northside 0.6467 0.6518 0.6657 0.6630 0.6761 0.6602 
60630 1.4 62244 Northside 0.6137 0.6151 0.6405 0.6524 0.6595 0.6366 
60631 0.5 76400 Northside 0.5840 0.5989 0.6017 0.6493 0.5924 0.6064 
60634 1.4 56382 Northside 0.5854 0.5877 0.6201 0.6319 0.6160 0.6087 
60639 16.6 38798 Northside 0.6177 0.6565 0.6590 0.6508 0.6227 0.6425 
60640 18.1 47631 Northside 0.5996 0.6002 0.6405 0.6793 0.6499 0.6348 
60641 2.8 51597 Northside 0.6167 0.6360 0.6506 0.6501 0.6494 0.6407 
60644 94.3 26882 Northside 0.6117 0.6681 0.6983 0.6855 0.6126 0.6618 
60645 14.9 47633 Northside 0.6400 0.6307 0.6707 0.6657 0.6671 0.6543 
60646 0.8 73246 Northside 0.6024 0.5945 0.6372 0.6406 0.6220 0.6179 
60647 7.4 56257 Northside 0.5624 0.5954 0.6010 0.6404 0.6177 0.6039 
60651 63.7 32006 Northside 0.5867 0.6504 0.6772 0.6592 0.6442 0.6473 
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60654 7.3 90520 Northside 0.5339 0.5368 0.5781 0.5977 0.5865 0.5646 
60656 1.8 57308 Northside 0.7094 0.6864 0.7339 0.7062 0.7397 0.7143 
60657 2.8 79638 Northside 0.5305 0.5352 0.5809 0.6225 0.6002 0.5734 
60659 8.9 48104 Northside 0.6753 0.6575 0.6977 0.7005 0.7244 0.6917 
60660 15.7 41412 Northside 0.6487 0.6177 0.6691 0.6893 0.6727 0.6586 
60661 6.9 98882 Northside 0.5119 0.5447 0.6163 0.6004 0.5938 0.5696 
60706 0.7 52429 Northside 0.6857 0.6046 0.6995 0.6964 0.7628 0.6946 
60707 16.5 54669 Northside 0.6398 0.6437 0.6567 0.6689 0.6711 0.6566 
x x x 34 Zip Codes 0.5959 0.6085 0.6441 0.6415 0.6310 0.6247 
x x x Chicago 0.5956 0.6106 0.6414 0.6443 0.6235 0.6238 
x x x Difference 0.0003 -0.0021 0.0027 -0.0028 0.0075 0.0009 
 
